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Appendix A
Accident Reporting under the Negligence System
It is extremely difficult to get comparable estimates of workers' losses due
to nonfatal accidents because of substantial differences in the reporting
of such accidents under negligence liability and workers' compensation.
Comparisons of the number of nonfatal accidents reported to bureaus of
labor before and after workers' compensation show that two to ten times
as many serious nonfatal accidents were reported after workers' compen-
sation was introduced. By contrast, fatal accident reporting did not spike
upward after workers' compensation was adopted.
The differences in reporting under the two systems may have been
caused by the disparate benefits the injured expected to receive under the
two regimes. Under negligence liability workers had little incentive to re-
port accidents to employers if they felt that there was little chance of re-
ceiving compensation. By reporting such an accident, the worker would
be signaling to the employer that he was "accident prone," or worse yet
that he was a "troublesome" employee. Either label might lead to negative
repercussions. Similarly, employers had little incentive to reveal accidents
to bureaus of labor unless they knew that the worker was going to press
the issue with a suit or a request for compensation. By reporting relatively
more accidents, the employer would have raised the factory inspectors'
awareness of problems at his workplace, thus raising the risk of inspec-
tions and possible fines. Under workers' compensation, however, all work-
place accidents were potentially compensable, so workers had far more in-
centive to report them and pursue their entitled benefits.'
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In the course of examining the accident reporting issue, we have col-
lected evidence from a variety of sources. This information is summa-
rized below.
Accident Reporting at the Stonega Coke and Coal Company
One sign of the accident reporting problem within a single firm can be
seen by studying the records of the Stonega Coke and Coal Company,
which was primarily located in Virginia. The Annual Reports of the Opera-
tions Department reported a doubling in the rate of serious and slight ac-
cidents once workers' compensation was enacted. The number of serious
accidents reported rose from 29 per million tons of coal produced during
the period 1912 to 1918 (before workers' compensation in Virginia) to 61
per million tons in the period 1919 to 1925 (when workers' compensation
was in effect). The number of slight accidents rose from 111 per million
tons in 1912-1918 to 232 per million tons in 1919-1925. The reporting of
fatal accidents was not nearly as different under the two legal systems. The
number of fatalities per million tons held roughly constant at 0.005 per
million tons in 1912-1918 and 0.004 per million tons in l9l9l925.2
Illinois Coal Mines
Between 1897 and 1906 the Annual Coal Reports of the Illinois Bureau
of Labor Statistics reported an average of 118.7 fatal accidents per year
and 492.4 nonfatal accidents during a period when the average number of
employees rose from 33,788 to 61,988 men. In the report of the Illinois
Industrial Commission for the calendar year 1919, by which time workers'
compensation had been in effect for several years, coal mining experienced
145 deaths and 7,652 compensable injuries while employing approximately
87,000 men.3
Iowa Coal Mines
From 1906 to 1910, Iowa coal mines reported an average of 35.4 fatal
accidents per year and 108.2 nonfatal accidents per year, while employing
an average of 17,491 workers.4 During the two-year period ending 30 June
1914, when workers' compensation was in effect in the state, the Iowa In-
dustrial Commissioner (1914, 48-49) reported an average of 33 fatal acci-
dents per year, 2 permanent total disability accidents, 22.5 permanent par-
tial disability accidents, 216 temporary disability accidents lasting longer
than two weeks, and 684 minor injuries.Minnesota
In 1909 the Minnesota legislature required employers to report their
accidents to the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industries. Extant
letters between the department and Minnesota employers show that the
department took its responsibility of investigating accidents in the state
very seriously. A clipping department within the department scoured the
state's newspapers looking for evidence of industrial accidents. If it found
a mention of an accident, without receiving notification from the com-
pany, a letter of inquiry was generated. In general, the department believed
that large numbers of firms were underreporting accidents. In quite a few
cases the department sent out incredulous letters to firms that did not send
any information about accidents. The archives of the department at the
Minnesota State Historical Society in St. Paul contain many letters like
the one of 29 September 1911, in which Labor Commissioner Houk sent
a letter to the Parker and Topping Foundry asking, "Can it be possible
that no accidents have occurred in that length of time [year ending 31 July
1911] to the people in the employ of said company?"
Ohio
Ohio is a valuable state to study the differences in reporting because it
was quick to establish an industrial commission to oversee workers' com-
pensation and it had a strong factory inspection law prior to the legisla-
tion. The same dramatic increase in the reporting of serious and minor
injuries occurred. Just prior to the passage of the state's workers' compen-
sation law, Ohio in 1910 tightened the rules for reporting accidents. As a
result there was a substantial increase in the reporting of nonfatal acci-
dents from 1910 to 1911: the number of serious nonfatal accidents rose
from 795 to 1,481. Once workers' compensation was established and
firmly in place, the number of serious accidents took another sharp turn
upward from 1,481 to 7,344. When we compare the figures from 1910 to
1912, the number of fatal accidents in each industry changed very little,
from 163 to 195. On the other hand, the number of serious accidents (dis-
ability lasting more than seven days) rose nearly tenfold from 795 to 7,344,
while the number of minor accidents (disability of seven days or less) rose
from 1,499 to 5,l6l. The accident statistics from the factory inspection
reports pale in comparison with the annualized number of industrial ac-
cidents reported under workers' compensation for the eighteen-month
period from 1 January 1914 to 30 June 1915 (we annualized the report by
dividing the number of accidents by 1.5). Because the workers' compensa-
tion report included a number of industries not listed in the factory inspec-
tion reports, we compare the situations where we believe the industrial
categories matched up in the two reports. Typically, the number of fatal
Accident Reporting under the Negligence System 207208Appendix B
accidents reported is similar in both reports. There are, however, dramatic
differences in the number of serious and minor accidents reported. The
rise in reported accidents is at least double in every category and in some
cases there is a tenfold increase. The sheer difference in accident reporting
under the two systems suggests that it is extremely difficult to compare the
compensation of nonfatal accidents before and after workers' compen-
sation. In appendix C, however, we attempt such a comparison using two
different methods. One method uses workers' reports of their accident com-
pensation, which is surely to be plagued with the underreporting problem,
and the other uses data from employers' reports of their accident compen-
sation.
Appendix B
Workers' Compensation Benefits and the
Construction of the Expected Benefits Variable
Workers' compensation laws established parameters for the payment of
benefits to workers injured on the job and the families of workers who
were killed in workplace accidents. Injured workers typically received pay-
ments of up to two-thirds of their weekly wage each week for the period
of the disability, while the families of fatalities typically received weekly pay-
ments for a period of up to eight years. The parameters for compensation
varied across states and by type of accident. In this appendix we describe
the various payment parameters and show how we construct the expected
benefits variable that is discussed in chapters 3 and 7.
Fatal Accident Payments
Table B. 1 summarizes the provisions related to fatal accidents at the end
of the first year of operation of each state's workers' compensation law.6
In many states the percentage of the wage replaced varied in proportion
to the number of family members. To aid comparability, the calculations
in all of the benefit calculations are based on the assumption that the de-
ceased's family consisted of a widow age thirty-five, a child age ten, and
a second child age eight. We also assumed that the deceased's widow did
not remarry and lived another thirty years. The New Jersey law of 1911,
which established a pattern followed by many states, offered this family
weekly payments equal to 45 percent of the worker's wage for up to three
hundred weeks. Weekly benefits could not be lower than five dollars a
week or higher than ten dollars a week, and the sum of the payments
could not exceed three thousand dollars or be lower than fifteen hundred





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Construction of the Expected Benefits Variable211
for funeral expenses. Several states deviated from the New Jersey pattern.
Washington, West Virginia, and Oregon established fixed weekly pay-
ments. Oklahoma did not pay workers' compensation benefits for fatal ac-
cidents. Nevada, California, Maryland, and Kansas chose the total pay-
ment level based on three times annual earnings, while Wisconsin, Illinois,
and South Dakota based it on four times annual earnings. Wyoming paid
a fixed lump sum for fatal accidents based on the number of survivors.
Some states chose not to limit either the number of weeks of payment or
the maximum total payout.
Nearly all states focused on paying the money weekly over an extended
period of time. Most states legally allowed for accident victims to be paid
a lump sum after an appeal, usually using a discount rate between 3 and
6 percent to determine the size of the lump sum. Our impression, however,
is that the administrators of workers' compensation discouraged the pay-
ment of a lump sum.7 To allow easier comparisons of the fatal accident
parameters in each of the states, we have calculated the present value of
the stream of weekly payments prescribed by the workers' compensation
acts using a discount rate of 5 percent. We assumed that the worker was
paid the national average weekly wage at the time of the accident. As an
example, the present value of the stream of payments for the New Jersey
family in 1911 was $1,840.
The present values for the states adopting later in the period appear
artificially high in comparison with those for states adopting earlier be-
cause the national average weekly wage more than doubled over the time
period. Therefore, we have also calculated a ratio of the present value of
fatal benefits to annual earnings, which were calculated as fifty weeks
times the national weekly wage. In terms of fatal accident payments, the
least generous states were Georgia, Vermont, and Virginia, each with pres-
ent values that replaced less than two years' income. Generally, these states
had relatively low maximum weekly payments. The states with present
values that replaced more than five times annual incomesWashington,
New York, Oregon, West Virginia, and South Dakotagenerally did not
limit the length of time for fatal accident payments or impose maximum
total payments. The relative generosity of these high-benefit states is
affected more by the discount rate than in the rest of the states. For ex-
ample, raising the discount rate from 5 percent to 10 percent lowered the
ratio from 6.08 to 4 in Washington in 1911, while lowering the ratio in
New Jersey from 2.48 to 2.19.
Nonfatal Accident Payments
Another major component of workers' compensation was the benefits
paid for nonfatal accidents, which were far more common than fatal acci-
dents. Nonfatal accidents were separated into three major categories: per-
manent total disability (e.g., full paralysis), permanent partial disability212Appendix B
(e.g., loss of a hand), and temporary disability (e.g., broken leg). In most
states, the compensation for nonfatal accidents followed the general pat-
tern of that for fatal accidents. During his disability the worker was paid
a percentage of his weekly wage, subject to statutory minimum and maxi-
mum payments, for a maximum number of weeks. Each state established
a waiting period, ranging from three days to two weeks from the date of
the accident, during which time no accident compensation was paid. In-
jured workers who were out of work for a period less than the waiting pe-
riod received no compensation. In some states at the time of introduction
(and later in most states), workers with more serious injuries that lasted
beyond four to eight weeks were able to collect compensation forgone dur-
ing the waiting period, retroactively. The rules for permanent total disabil-
ity payments, say for full paralysis, were similar to the rules for fatal acci-
dent payments (without the funeral expense payments) in nearly every
state.
To show how the various states compensated temporary total disability,
table B.2 shows the waiting period, the retroactive pay feature, the per-
centage of the wage replaced, and the minimum and maximum weekly
payments. For example, a worker injured for five weeks in New Jersey in
1911 would have started receiving payments for his injury after two weeks.
For the remaining three weeks of his injury he was paid half of his weekly
wage, and the payment could not be lower than $5 or higher than $10. A
worker receiving the national weekly wage of$14.83 would have been paid
$7.41 5 per week for three weeks for a total of $22.245. The present value
of this stream of income using continuous discounting and a discount rate
of 5 percent was $22.11, which was 1.49 times the national weekly wage.
Comparison of all the states in table B.2 in their first year of operation
shows that North Dakota in 1919 was the most generous for temporary to-
tal disability at 3.31 times the weekly wage, while Missouri and Oregon had
ratios of almost 3 times the weekly wage. The three states combined rela-
tively generous maximums with either no waiting period or the payment
of retroactive benefits after a relatively short period of time. It is important
to note, however, that states starting operation later generally were adopt-
ing benefit parameters that were similar to the parameters in other states
at that time.
Permanent partial disabilities ranged from the loss of a finger to the loss
of a leg. It was anticipated that someone with a permanent partial disabil-
ity might be able to continue to work, although the type of work depended
on the disability. Table B.3 shows the rules for compensating people who
lost a hand. Among the states that adopted workers' compensation earlier,
the typical pattern was to pay the worker as if he were totally disabled for
a period of time and then begin paying the worker a partial disability
payment. In New Jersey in 1911, the worker was paid as if he were totally
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































oConstruction of the Expected Benefits Variable217
then he began receiving payments of half his wage for 150 weeks. The
weekly payments could not exceed $10 or be lower than $5. For a worker
receiving the national weekly wage at the time of the accident, the present
value of this stream of payments, discounted at 5 percent, would have
been $1,117, which was roughly 1.5 times his average annual earnings (50
weeks times the national weekly wage). In most of the rest of the states,
like Michigan in 1912, the injured worker received just the hand payments
without any period of receiving temporary total disability payments. The
Michigan payment stream for a worker earning the national weekly wage
of $15.34 a week led to a present value of $1,070, which was 1.39 times
average annual earnings. In Washington and Wyoming the hand payment
was typically paid as a lump sum. Most other states allowed the worker
to receive a lump sum under appeal, but they generally did not encourage
the practice.
Calculating Expected Benefits
The relative generosity of the states sometimes varied for different types
of accidents. Table B.4 combines the present values of the accident pay-
ments into a measure of expected benefits to develop a summary measure
of workers' compensation benefits. For each type of accident we calcu-
lated the gross benefit as the present value of the stream of payments for
that type of accident. We then converted these gross benefit estimates into
an expected benefit measure (E(B)) by weighting each of the four types of
accident benefits by the probability that each type of accident would occur
and then summing the four expected compensation estimates, as in the
following equation:
E(B) = pB + + +
where B is the benefit paid and p is the probability that the accident will
occur. The subscript f denotes fatal accidents, pt permanent total disabil-
ity, pp permanent partial disability, and tt represents temporary total dis-
ability. In essence, the expected benefit shows what an insurance company
might expect to pay to the families of workplace accident victims earning
the national weekly wage during the course of a year.
The accident probabilities for the expected benefits calculations in ta-
bles B.4 and 7.1 are based on the manufacturing average for Oregon and
represent the average accident experiences of all Oregon industries (Ore-
gon Industrial Accident Commission 1919, 28-42). The probability of a
fatal accident over the course of a year was 0.001895, for permanent total
disability 0.000136, for permanent partial disability 0.0099, and for tem-
porary total disability 0.1199. After multiplying these probabilities by the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that a permanent partial disability typically was about 21.8 percent of the
hand benefits, table B.4 reports the expected workers' compensation bene-
fit in each state during the first year of operation. For workers earning the
national weekly wage in New Jersey in 1911, an insurer might have antici-
pated paying out $8.81 per worker, or approximately 1.19 percent of the
workers' annual earnings, in workers' compensation benefits. In chapter 7
we discuss the factors determining the choice of benefit levels and table
7.1 compares the expected benefits in each state from the first year of
operation through 1930.
In calculating the expected benefits we merged the fatal accident and
permanent total disability accident categories together because perma-
nent total disability accidents, like full paralysis, were relatively rare and
the payments were very close to the fatal accident payouts. Workers' com-
pensation benefits and the expected benefit measure are based on the
workers' weekly wage. We used different weekly wages for expected bene-
fits calculations in different settings. When comparing the workers' com-
pensation benefits across states and time in tables B. 1 through B.4 and
when analyzing the determinants of expected benefits in chapter 7 and
table 7.1, we used the national average weekly wage in manufacturing. In
the wage offset regressions discussed in chapter 3 and appendix D, we used
the national average weekly wage for each occupation in the sample. In the
analysis of household savings in chapter 3, table 3.4, and appendix F, we
used the weekly wage for the head of the household, which was reported
in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) cost-of-living sample.
We obtained the statutory descriptions from various bulletins of the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Workmen's Compensation and In-
surance Series (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1914, 1917, 1918, 1923,
1926b), Hookstadt (1920, 1922), and Clark and Frincke (1921). We also
consulted Jones (1927). When questions arose about the timing of changes
in the law, the state's statutes were consulted directly.
For fatal accidents, the typical law allowed weekly payments to be a
percentage (up to two-thirds) of the weekly wage for a specified period of
time. We calculated the present value (using continuous discounting) of
the stream of benefits using a discount rate of 5 percent, which was the
typical return on stocks and bonds for the period. The rate of 5 percent
also was in the range of statutory rates used when the stream of workers'
compensation benefits were converted to lump sums. The calculations
were sometimes complicated because states usually imposed maximums
on the weekly payment or maximums on the sum total of all the weekly
payments. If the percentage times the weekly wage exceeded the maximum
weekly payment, we inserted the maximum weekly payment into the pres-
ent value calculations. In cases where there was a maximum total payment,
we assumed the family received the regular weekly payment until the total
undiscounted stream of payments reached the maximum total. Thus, weConstruction of the Expected Benefits Variable 221
determined the number of weekly payments by taking the maximum total
divided by the weekly payment (states did not worry about discounting
issues when deciding when a family reached its maximum total benefit).
For the loss of a hand, the typical state paid a percentage of the weekly
wage for a fixed amount of time, subject to minimum and maximum
weekly amounts. Some states commenced the hand payments after the
worker collected a statutory amount of temporary disability pay. Follow-
ing the recommendations of the International Association of Industrial
Accident Boards and Commissions in 1920 (Hookstadt 1920, 77), we as-
sumed that the loss of a hand temporarily disabled the worker fully for
fifteen weeks before he could return to work. We calculated the present
value of the stream of payments using continuous discounting. It was im-
portant to calculate the present value because some states would pay a
relatively small amount per week for the rest of the worker's life. Without
discounting, the total amount paid would look quite large when, in fact,
the present value of the stream of payments was in the range of other
states' benefits. In the few cases where a hand payment was not mentioned
specifically, we followed the BLS in describing it as a 50 percent disability
For the permanent partial disability category, we used the loss of a hand
as a typical accident because the payment structure for the amputation of
a hand was defined in almost all of the states' laws. The typical accident
in the permanent partial category, however, was actually much less serious.
Based on accident statistics reported by the Wisconsin Industrial Com-
mission (1915, 41; 1916, 44; 1917, 6-7) for 1914 to 1917, we found that
the average payment for a permanent partial disability was 21.9 percent
of that for the loss of a hand. Thus, in the expected benefits calculations,
we scaled down the present value of the hand payment by multiplying the
figure by 21.9 percent. We treated the typical temporary disability acci-
dent as one in which the injured worker was out of work for five weeks.
For temporary disabilities, workers were paid a percentage of their
weekly wage during the period of the disability, which we assumed to be
five weeks. These payments were usually subject to minimum and maxi-
mum weekly amounts. Nearly all states had waiting periods. In many cases
a worker injured for five weeks would receive no payment for the first three
to fourteen days of the disability, such that he might receive as few as three
weekly payments. In a number of states, the worker would receive nothing
during the waiting period, but if the disability lasted beyond four weeks
(up to eight weeks in some states) the worker would eventually receive a
retroactive payment for the first week or two of the disability We have
made our calculations sensitive to these nuances across states.
In a number of years the statutory parameters of the law changed. For
the purposes of the wage regression analysis in chapter 3 and in appendix
D, we determined from the states' session laws when the new workers'
compensation provisions went into effect. We then used a weighted aver-222 Appendix B
age of the benefits calculated under the old and new laws, with the weight
being the percentage of time during the year that each law was in effect.
In the wage regressions we wanted the benefits throughout the year be-
cause the wages were typically averages of the wages throughout the years.
When we calculated the expected benefit values in tables B. 1 through B.4
and in table 7.1, we focused instead on the benefits as they existed at the
end of the year. In these situations our focus is on the decisions made by
legislatures as to the benefits that they wanted to establish, which was best
represented by what was in place after the legislature had met.
In the years prior to the introduction of workers' compensation, the
courts and settlements with employers determined the payments to injured
workers. We need to come up with measures of the generosity of negli-
gence liability for states without workers' compensation for the wage re-
gressions and the savings analysis in chapter 3 and appendixes D and F.
Based on the material presented in table 2.1, we assumed that the family
of a worker killed in a workplace accident could expect to receive about
half a year's income on average (which takes into account the probability
of getting nothing). We then calculated the payment for a hand to be 54.02
percent of the fatal accident benefit and for the five-week disability to be
1.557 percent of the fatal accident benefit. These percentages were based
on national averages of the ratios of hand-to-death benefits and disability-
to-death benefits from all workers' compensation states during the year
1923. It is clear that the generosity of the liability systems varied across
states because insurance companies established state differentials for em-
ployers' liability premiums in their ratebooks. The state differentials would
typically reflect differences in the liability rules and differences in the court
treatments of accident compensation. The differentials are reported in
DeLeon (1907, 26-27). To make this calculation we multiplied the bene-
fits above by the state's reported liability differential and then divided by
0.64333, which was the average liability differential reported for the forty-
six states plus Arizona and New Mexico (still territories in 1909) in the
sample.
It is clear that our estimates of the negligence liability payments suffer
from measurement error because we cannot make the calculations with as
much certainty as we did for workers' compensation because there were
no statutory proscriptions under the negligence system. We have experi-
mented with a variety of measures of the benefits under negligence liability
and generally have obtained similar results to the ones reported in chapter
3, appendix D, and appendix F. In both the wage analyses and the savings
and insurance analyses, we ran tests in which we assumed that families re-
ceived nothing under the nonworkers' compensation regime and we tried
using the benefits without adjusting for the liability differential. The fun-
damental results remain the same.
The probabilities of each type of accident were derived from differentConstruction of the Expected Benefits Variable223
sources for each of the analyses. In the wage regression analysis in chapter
3 and appendix D for the coal industry we started with an average fatal
accident rate of 2.043 per million man hours from the sample of coal states
used to estimate the wage equation (Fishback 1992, 87). To translate that
into a fatal accident rate per full-year worked of 3.37 per one thousand
men, we assumed that the men worked 206.4 eight-hour days (from the
sample means). The remaining coal accident rates were determined by com-
paring the relative number of fatal cases (61), permanent total disability
cases (3), permanent partial disability cases (82), and temporary disabil-
ity cases (1,971) receiving compensation in coal mining from the Ohio
State Insurance Fund during the eighteen months ending 30 June 1915.
For example, the permanent total disability probability is calculated as the
probability of a fatal accident in coal mining (0.00337) multiplied by the
ratio of the number of permanent total disability cases to the number of
fatal cases in Ohio (three to sixty-one). Using the Ohio workers' compen-
sation information to estimate the probability of nonfatal accidents under-
states the actual probability of an accident because some injured workers
were not compensated and, thus, were not included in the official accident
statistics. The lumber and building trades accident rates in the wage re-
gressions in chapter 3 and appendix D were obtained from the Oregon
Industrial Accident Commission (1919, 28-42). The commission reported
the total number of accidents in each accident category and the number
of full-time workers covered under the workers' compensation system.
Expected benefits in the wage regression analyses discussed in chapter
3 and appendix D were based on the national average wage for each oc-
cupation in each year. We did not use the wage corresponding to each
observation because the expected benefits would have been a function of the
wage, thus imparting a positive bias to the estimated coefficients of the
expected benefits index. Similarly, we could not use the ratio of expected
benefits to wages because in some cases maximum allowable benefits be-
came binding and the ratio of expected benefits to wages would have im-
parted a spurious negative bias. To eliminate these problems, we used the
national average wage for each occupation in each year, which allowed the
expected benefits index to rise in response to rising wages during the pe-
riod as well as reflect differences in expected benefits driven by differences
in wages at each skill level. Thus, the expected benefits variable becomes
an instrumental variable for the actual expected benefits the worker would
receive. For a particular occupation, even though our calculation assumed
a constant wage across all states, each state's expected calculation measure
in a particular year was different because each state's law was unique. In
addition, because a state's law might have changed over the period of
study, the expected benefits measure for an occupation class would have
changed over time (holding state and average occupational wages con-
stant). Further, if we were to hold a state's law constant over time, nominal224Appendix C
expected benefits would change because average occupational wages fluc-
tuated over the course of the sample. Thus, the factors that caused each
observation to take a unique value were occupational differences, changes
in average occupational wages over time, differences in each state's work-
ers' compensation law, and changes in states' laws over time.
In the calculations for tables B. 1 to B.4 and 7.1, the national average
manufacturing weekly wage was constructed using Paul Douglas's mea-
sures of weekly hours and hourly earnings (series D-765 and D-766 in U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1975, 168) for the years 1890 to 1926. We then
interpolated values for the years 1927 through 1930 by running a regres-
sion of the weekly wage measure on Stanley Lebergott's measure of av-
erage annual earnings per full-time employee for manufacturing (series
D-740 in U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 166), divided by fifty-two. The
interpolated values for 1927 through 1930 are equal to 2.021638 +
1.080317 times the Lebergott measure of weekly wages.
Appendix C
Measuring the Change in Accident Benefits from
Negligence Liability to Workers' Compensation
To show the relative generosity of the nonfatal accident benefits under the
two systems, we compare the expected benefits, E(B), that were paid as a
share of income, holding accident rates constant. Let
E(B) = pB +
where p is the probability of an accident and B is the average payment for
fatal (f) and nonfatal (n) accidents. To make comparisons across time, we
divided the expected benefits by average annual income to compare ex-
pected benefits as a percentage of workers' annual income or employers'
payrolls. Since the number of reported nonfatal accidents rose sharply
with the introduction of workers' compensation (see app. A), the nonfatal
portion of the expected benefits measure may have risen either because a
higher percentage of actual accidents received compensation or because
the average percentage of wages paid as benefits increased.
We have tried to make comparisons of the generosity of workers' com-
pensation benefits in two ways. First, we tried comparing the expected
payment of wage benefits (ignoring medical payments) by fixing the prob-
ability of compensation and then calculating the payments that injured
workers reportedly received for different types of accidents under negli-
gence liability. We then compared these amounts to the statutory pay-
ments that workers' compensation guaranteed. Second, we examined em-Measuring the Change in Accident Benefits225
ployers' reports on the amounts of wage benefits, settlements, and medical
payments that they and their insurance companies paid to the families of
accident victims under the negligence system. We then compared these fig-
ures to similar reports generated by workers' compensation commissions
on the amounts of wages and medical benefits that workers received. The
comparisons were made in terms of employers' total payments relative to
their payroll expenditures.
The employer-based technique has one major advantage over the
worker-based technique. When employers' liability commissions sought a
sample of accident victims, they usually started with accidents reported to
the state bureau of labor. Since the reporting of nonfatal accidents (lasting
longer than a week) rose substantially with the introduction of workers'
compensation, it is likely that our estimates of the change in payments per
nonfatal accident are overstated when we rely on injured workers' reports.
By contrast, from the employers' reports, we are likely to get a better pic-
ture of their expenditures under negligence liability because the employer
did not have to reveal the total number of accidents, only how much was
paid in the aggregate. Our measure of employers' expenditures under both
legal regimes combines both the probability of the accident and the payout
per accident. Therefore, even if the underlying accident probabilities re-
mained the same, the total payments per dollar on the payroll might have
risen because of an increase in reported accidents that received compensa-
tion and/or an increase in compensation per accident. The total payments
might also have risen because of an increase in the underlying probability
of accidents resulting from moral hazard. We do not believe that the rise
in the underlying probability of accidents is nearly as great as the rise in
the reporting of accidents.
Comparisons Based on Injured Workers' Reports
In table B.4 we report a measure of expected benefits under workers'
compensation in New York in 1914 as 2.42 percent of annual earnings.
This calculation was based on inserting values into the following equation:
(Cl) E(B)=pfBf+ + +
whereBis the benefit paid and p is the probability of an accident. The
subscriptf denotes fatal accidents,pt represents accidents causing perma-
nent total disability, pp is permanent partial disability, and ttis temporary
total disability. We then divided the expected benefits by annual earnings.
See appendix B for further details.
In our calculation for the negligence system we focus on wage replace-
ment. We believe that medical coverage was better under workers' com-
pensation, but it is much harder to document the extent of medical cover-226Appendix C
age than it is to document wages. By eliminating medical payments, how-
ever, we believe that we are biasing the calculations against finding that
workers' compensation was more generous. As a starting point, we use
accident probabilities based on workers' compensation experience to cal-
culate the expected payouts under both negligence liability and workers'
compensation. The biases that result from this assumption are discussed
below. The expected benefits under each system are calculated as:
(C2) E(B) = O.00l89SB + 0.000l36B + 0.009932B
+ 0.1199l6B.
The accident probabilities represent the experience in Oregon from 1917
to 1919 across all industries, as reported in Oregon Industrial Accident
Commission (1919). We calculated the accident probabilities as the num-
ber of compensable accidents divided by the number of workers covered.
The New York Commission on Employers' Liability (1910, 210-11,
246-50) conducted a series of direct interviews of a random sample of
workers who had been injured and whose accidents had been reported to
the New York Bureau of Factory Inspection. The average annual earnings
for workers in New York at the time was $536 (p. 223), which translates
into weekly earnings of $10.3 1.8 The workers experiencing temporary dis-
ability received $10,623 in wage payments on lost earnings of $66,854. In
addition they received $11,663 in other receipts (we believe these include
settlements). Eleven workers had suits pending. We assume that workers
won half the cases and received $200 in each case for an additional $1,100.
Thus, employers were replacing 34.98 percent of the lost earnings. For com-
parative purposes we assumed the typical temporary disability involved
five weeks of lost wages. Therefore, if the average wage replacement for
five weeks of lost earnings was about 35 percent, then the average replace-
ment per accident was $18.
In forty-eight fatal accident cases in the survey (p. 249), employers
paid a total of $22,343 in settlements plus $2,274 in medical or funeral ex-
penses, and eight suits were pending. We assume that funeral expenses
were half of the $2,274 and that workers' heirs won or settled half of the
pending cases, receiving an average payment of $2,000 for an additional
payout of $8,000. If we include all other receipts of $1,840 as coming from
employers, then total fatal accident payments were $33,320, or $694.17
per case.
There were ten permanent complete disability cases, where employers
paid settlements of $965 (p. 247). One case was pending and we assume
that it paid $2,000. The total payout was therefore $2,965, or an average
of $296.50 per case. If we include all other receipts of $656, the payout
was $3,621, or $362.10 per case.
There were sixty permanent partial disability cases, with settlementsMeasuring the Change in Accident Benefits 227
equal to $7,950. Ten cases were pending. Assuming that workers won half
the cases and received $2,000 each, the total payout was $17,950, or
$299.16 per case. If we add in other receipts of $4,196, the total is $22,146,
or $369.10 per case.
Inserting these payment values across the different types of accidents
into equation C2, the calculation becomes
E(B) = 0.001895*694 + 0.000136*362 + 0.009932*369
+ 0.119916*18.03 = $7.19,
which is 1.34 percent of the $536 annual wage.
Using the same accident rates and the weekly wage of $10.31, we cal-
culated the present value of the benefits that would have been paid for a
typical accident in each category under New York's workers' compensa-
tion law that went into effect in 1914. We gave the same payment for per-
manent total disability as we did for a fatal accident. As reported above
we treated the typical temporary disability accident as one in which the
injured worker was out of work for five weeks. For the permanent partial
disability category, we calculated the benefits for the loss of a hand as a
typical accident and then adjusted the payment downward by multiplying
by 0.219 because the typical accident in the permanent partial category
was actually much less serious than a hand amputation. The 0.2 19 figure
is based on actual accident statistics reported by the Wisconsin Industrial
Commission (1915, 41; 1916, 44; 1917, 6-7) for 1914 to 1917. For more de-
tails about the precise procedure, see appendix B on the construction of
the expected benefits variable.
For a worker earning $10.31 a week or $536 per year, the New York
workers' compensation law promised expected benefits equal to $12.54,
which was 2.34 percent of annual wages and roughly 75 percent more than
what was paid under negligence liability.9
The rise in expected benefits received by workers when workers' com-
pensation was introduced in New York is probably understated in this an-
alysis. First, the estimate of expected benefits per nonfatal accident are
probably substantially overstated in the negligence liability case because
of problems faced in the reporting of accidents to the New York Bureau
of Labor Statistics. We fixed the probability of an accident in the equa-
tions based on accident probabilities under workers' compensation. How-
ever, as we have suggested above, there was a significant rise in the reporting
of nonfatal accidents when workers' compensation was introduced. This
suggests that there was substantial underreporting of accidents by employ-
ers under negligence liability, and it is likely they would not report injuries
where they paid no compensation. Since the sample of injured workers
collected by the New York Commission on Employers' Liability was drawn
from reports to the New York Bureau of Labor, it is likely that it is missing228Appendix C
a large number of nonfatal accidents for which no payment was made to
workers. The biggest effect this reporting might have on our calculation is
on the payments to temporarily totally disabled workers and permanently
partial disabled workers. If we base calculations on the idea that reported
accidents for temporary total disablement doubled, we should cut the av-
erage payment for temporarily totally disabled workers from $18 to $9 per
accident, which would cut the expected benefits to $6.13, or 1.14 percent
of annual earnings. If we assume that reported accidents went up 1.5 times
for the accidents causing permanent partial disability, the expected bene-
fits fall further to $4.91, or 0.92 percent of expected earnings. Thus the
expected benefits might have risen 2.54 times with the introduction of
workers' compensation. 10
The near doubling in benefits also understates the rise in the net amount
received by workers after they paid legal fees. Evidence from various
sources suggests that workers paid lawyers' contingency fees under the
negligence system ranging from 20 to 50 percent. Evidence from Kansas
and Minnesota suggests that of payments made to workers, lawyers re-
ceived about 13 to 23 percent, which is lower than the contingency fees
because a number of workers did not hire lawyers. It is likely that some
workers hired lawyers to contest workers' compensation payments as well.
At most, 5 percent of the total amount that workers received went to law-
yers under workers' compensation. Thus, the expected net benefits after
paying legal fees rose from 0.75 percent of annual earnings under negli-
gence liability to 2.22 percent of annual earnings under workers' compen-
sation. The expected net benefits under workers' compensation might have
been as large as three times the levels received under negligence liability.
Comparisons Based on Employers' Reports
Our second method for making the benefits comparison is to start from
reports made by employers about their total accident expenditures that
injured workers received. The Wisconsin Bureau of Labor and Industrial
Statistics (WBLIS) conducted a survey of employers regarding their acci-
dent expenses in 1906 (see WBLIS 1909, 34-35). They received responses
from 540 establishments that reported both accident expenses and total
wages paid.1' The total accident expenses include all expenditures on in-
surance premiums, medical expenses not paid by the insurer, wages paid
during disablement, settlements, and payments to insurance companies
for workers' collective benefits. The study found that employers spent
$164,696 on accident expenses while paying $30,534 million in wages,
which translates into a rate of $0.53 for every $100 in wages paid for acci-
dent expenses. The WBLIS (p. 31) also found that the percentage of the
employers' expenditures on accidents that eventually reached the worker
(including compensation and aid before the worker paid attorney fees)Measuring the Change in Accident Benefits 229
was only 45.5 percent.12 Therefore, workers would have received only
about $75,000 of the employers' expenditures (before legal fees) which is
$0.245 in accident payments for every $100 in wages paid by the employer.
The estimate for Wisconsin is very similar to estimates calculated from
information provided by the employers' liability commissions in New York
at $0.298 per $100 on the payroll, Michigan at $0.34, and Massachusetts at
$0.29.13 Under workers' compensation in 1913, by contrast, the Wisconsin
Industrial Commission (1915, 32-38) calculated that workers received
wage and medical benefits of $0.82 for every $100 of payroll. This Wiscon-
sin comparison suggests that workers' compensation was 3.35 times more
generous than the negligence liability system.
As mentioned in chapter 3, we were concerned that the Wisconsin com-
parison may be biased because the industries surveyed in 1906 and 1913
differed. To examine this issue more carefully, we matched industries from
the 1906 and 1913 listings and found that in all but one of the twenty-
three comparisons workers' compensation benefits exceeded those under
negligence liability. These comparisons are presented in table C. 1.
We made another comparison based on the experience of the Stonega
Coke and Coal Company, largely based in Virginia, before and after work-
ers' compensation. The comparison is based on information reported in
the Annual Reports of the Operating Department for the years 1916-25. We
estimate the percentage of the payroll that went to compensation of work-
ers, excluding medical expenses.'4 For the period 1916 to 1918, the reports
of the legal department show the compensation paid to workers through
settlements and court suits. We believe that these reports give full coverage
of the payments, because numerous situations mention that there was con-
sultation with the liability insurance company. In no other place in the
annual operating reports could we find mention of expenditures for pay-
ments to workers. We followed the legal reports for years after 1916 to
1918 to see the final results of pending cases in those years. Therefore, we
believe that we have a good understanding of what Stonega paid to acci-
dent victims in the form of damages for accidents occurring between 19 16
and 1918. Stonega spent roughly $52,225 on settlements and court awards
for accidents occurring during this period.'5 Stonega's payroll for coal
mining during this period was approximately $5,685,506; therefore Sto-
nega spent roughly $0.975 per $100 on the payroll on compensating work-
ers.'6 During the period 1919 to 1923, after workers' compensation was
established, we have information on the number of compensable weeks as-
sociated with accidents at the Stonega mines We translated this into work-
ers' compensation payments using the rule that Virginia paid 50 percent
of weekly earnings, with a minimum of $5 per week and a maximum of
$10 per week in compensation payments in 1919. The minimum rose to
$6 per week and the maximum to $12 per week in the 1920 session of the
legislature. Motormen during this period typically earned about $5 to $6Table C.! Generosity of Wage and Medical Benefits in Wisconsin before and after
Workers' Compensation, by Industry, 1906 and 1913
Benefits Workers Received per
$100 on Payroll in
Sources: Wisconsin Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics (1909, 31-35) and Wisconsin
Industrial Commission (1915).
Notes: The compensation amount in 1906 represents a gross figure, before attorneys fees are
subtracted. It is calculated by multiplying employers' total expenditures on accidents in 1906
by 45.6 percent, which is the percentage of the employers' expenditures that workers actually
received after all of the employers' expenses were subtracted, including employers' liability
insurance and collective accident insurance premiums. The amount that workers received
would have included compensation and medical aid not paid by insurers, and perhaps wages
paid during the disability. The benefits received by workers in 1913 from employers with
insurance is the "pure premium" listed by insurance companies with policies that had been
terminated. The pure premiums reflect the actual amounts insurance companies paid out to
the families of killed and injured workers. The expenditures by noninsured employers shows
the compensation and medical payments paid out during the year ending 31 December 1913.
Possible biases in the data: The Wisconsin Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics
(WBLIS) claimed that the entire amount of compensation paid in 1906 may not reflect the
amounts actually reported for 1906. However, the survey asked for all expenditures employ
ers had in the year 1906 on account of accidents. Many firms probably reported all expendi-
tures on accounts, including payouts for accidents from prior years, thus the typical annual
amount they paid would not be understated.
In 1913, the same questions arise for uninsured employers carrying their own risk. We do
not believe this is a problem for the insurance information in 1913 because it focuses on
completed policies, where some measure of the total payouts for which the insurer is liable
on accidents is included in the totals.
Matching industries: The industry titles in the 1906 and 1913 studies matched precisely for
agricultural implements, boots and shoes, furniture, machinery, and paper and pulp. We
matched chairs in 1906 with furniture for the insurance spending in 1913 and with wood-
working for the uninsured spending in 1913. We matched clothing and knit goods in 1906
with textiles in 1913; iron in 1906 with iron for insured in 1913, and iron and steel for unin-
sured in 1913; leather tanning in 1906 with other leather for insured in 1913, leather and
leather products for uninsured in 1913; lumber in 1906 with logging and lumbering in 1913;
malt liquors in 1906 with breweries in 1913; sheet metal in 1906 with metal working for
insured in 1913 and stamping works for uninsured in 1913.
Industry 1906









Agricultural implements .13 .59 4.5
Boots and shoes .08 .33 4.2
Chairs .06 .58 .30 9.2 4.7
Clothing .08 .16 .26 2.1 3.4
Furniture .14 .58 .30 4.1 2.1
Knit goods .05 .16 .26 3.2 5.2
Leather tanning .13 .12 .37 .95 2.9
Lumber .38 .58 .78 1.5 2.0
Machinery .25 .48 .49 1.95 2.0
Malt liquors .33 .52 .36 1.6 1.1
Paper and pulp .43 .93 .56 2.2 1.3
Sheet metal .41 .74 .58 1.8 1.4
Iron .12 .84 7.1Econometric Analysis Used to Estimate Wage Offsets 231
per day, or $20 to $24 for a four-day week. Thus coal miners were probably
receiving at least $9 per week in compensation for accidents, which would
imply payouts of $255,326 on a payroll of $14,983,930, or $1.70 per $100
on the payroll, which is about 74 percent higher than the payouts under
negligence liability.17 We should note that the rise in payouts is smaller
than what we see in Wisconsin and in New York in part because Virginia
during 1919 was one of the least generous workers' compensation states.
Comparisons of the generosity of workers' compensation in table B.4
show that Virginia's expected benefits in 1919 were about 0.87 percent of
annual earnings, compared with Wisconsin's index of 2.02 in 1911 and
New York's index of 2.42 in 1914. Further, the rise in benefits received by
workers may be understated for two reasons. The benefits under workers'
compensation do not include medical payments or funeral expenses,
whereas it is likely that the payments listed under negligence liability in
part covered medical and funeral expenses. As in other settings, we have
not yet subtracted the legal fees that workers paid under the two systems,
and legal fees were a higher percentage of negligence liability payments
than of workers' compensation payments.
Appendix D
Econometric Analysis Used to Estimate Wage Offsets
In chapter 3 we present several estimates of the wage offsets that workers
experienced when workers' compensation was introduced. This appendix
discusses the techniques used to estimate these wage offsets in more detail
(see also Fishback and Kantor 1995). To estimate how the wages of work-
ers adjusted in response to the introduction of workers' compensation, we
constructed three separate panel data sets for relatively dangerous indus-
tries in the early 1900s. The first sample covers hourly wage rates from
payrolls collected by the U.S. Bituminous Coal Commission. The sample
contains state averages for ten jobs from the twenty-three leading coal
producing states at the end of each year from 1911 to 1922. The second
sample is hourly earnings collected from payrolls by the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics for ten different jobs in the lumber industry for the years
1910 to 1913, 1915, 1921, and 1923 in the twenty-three major lumber pro-
ducing states. The third sample is the wage scales listed in union contracts
in the building trades for thirteen occupations in seventy-seven cities for
each year between 1907 and 1913.18 All three data sets allow examination
of differences across states and over time during the period when nearly
all the workers' compensation laws were adopted.
For each of the three industries, we estimate reduced-form, weighted232Appendix D
least squares wage regressions with the real hourly wage (in constant
1890-99 dollars) of occupation i in statej in year t (W) as the dependent
variable)9 The reduced-form equation that we estimate can be written as
= (D,E, 6, S, Y,
The reduced-form equation contains variables affecting the employers'
wage offer function and the workers' wage acceptance function. The em-
ployers' offers were influenced by fluctuations in the product market and
in worker productivity (D). Variables affecting the workers' wage accep-
tance function include the extent of postaccident benefits (B), measures
of restrictions on working time (WT,1), and the accident rate (Awhich
was available at the state level only for the coal sample). Workers seek
higher wages as compensation for lower accident benefits, greater restric-
tions on working time, and higher accident rates. For the coal industry
analysis we were also able to include a vector of information on strikes
and union strength (U1), which also might have affected the wages that
workers sought. A vector of state dummy variables (S., city dummies for
the building trades) controls for geographic differences in labor market
conditions, such as differences in the cost of living and other labor laws
specific to individual states. A vector of year dummies (Ye) controls for la-
bor market differences specific to each year, like the government's greater
control of markets during World War I. A vector of occupation dummy
variables (0,) in all of the regressions controls for skill differences and
other differences in the supply and demand conditions for those particu-
lar jobs.
The regression coefficients presented in table D. 1 are generally consis-
tent with the findings of other wage studies. Wage rates were positively
related to product prices in the coal and lumber samples, whereas in-
creases in building activity (measured by the real value of building permits
per capita) were associated with higher wages in the building trades.2° Out-
put per man hour was positively associated with wages in both the coal
and lumber industries. In all of the estimations, the coefficients of the oc-
cupation dummy variables suggest that higher skilled workers earned rela-
tively higher wages. Limitations on working time, as measured by full-time
hours, were offset by higher wages in the lumber sample.21 Unions and
strike activity were associated with higher wages in the coal industry, al-
though the union coefficient was statistically insignificant.
Columns (1), (3), and (5) in the table show the regression results when
the impact of workers' compensation is measured by a zero-one dummy
variable that takes the value one for states and years in which the law was
in effect, and zero otherwise. In coal mining the presence of a workers'
compensation law was associated with a statistically significant 2.16 per-Econometric Analysis Used to Estimate Wage Offsets 233
cent decline in hourly earnings when evaluated at the mean hourly earn-
ings. Similarly, the lumber industry wage offset was 1.60 percent and statis-
tically significant. In the building trades, however, the decline was smaller
at 0.33 percent, and not statistically different from zero.22
Columns (2), (4), and (6) of the table show the full regression results
when we use the expected benefits measure described in the text and in
appendix B to measure the impact of workers' compensation. The ex-
pected benefits measure is an index that corresponds better to the generos-
ity of employer-provided accident compensation both before and after
workers' compensation. It is calculated using the national average wage
for each occupation in each year. We did not use the wage corresponding
to each observation because the expected benefits would have been a func-
tion of the wage, thus imparting a positive bias to the estimated coeffi-
cients of the expected benefits index. Similarly, we could not use the ratio
of expected benefits to wages because in some cases maximum allowable
benefits became binding and the ratio of expected benefits to wages would
have imparted a spurious negative bias. To eliminate these problems, we
used the national average wage for each occupation in each year, which
allowed the expected benefits index to rise in response to rising wages
during the period as well as reflect differences in expected benefits driven
by differences in wages at each skill level.23
The expected benefits variable is therefore an instrumental variable that
measures the monetary value that a risk-neutral worker would place on
his expected accident compensation. If workers were risk-averse, however,
our measure of expected compensation actually provides a lower-bound
estimate of the value that workers would have placed on these postacci-
dent benefits. A coefficient of 1 implies that workers fully paid for in-
creases in the expected benefits that they received, although the worker
would not have fully paid for the employer's cost of purchasing insurance
to provide those benefits. Coefficients of roughly 1.67 imply that employ-
ers were able to pass on their full insurance costs to workers.
We have also estimated the various wage equations using a semilog
specification often used in wage studies. Table D.2 gives a summary of the
accident benefit coefficients from a variety of different empirical specifi-
cations. Column (1) of the table corresponds to the second column for
each sample in table D. 1. Column (2) of table D.2 shows the change in the
wage associated with a one-dollar increase in expected benefits under the
semilog specification, evaluated at the sample mean of average annual
earnings for each industry. The absolute values of t-statistics are listed in
parentheses below the estimates of the wage offsets. The estimates based
on the semilog specification are similar to the results reported in the level
specification.24





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Econometric Analysis Used to Estimate Wage Offsets 237
various labor demand and supply variables in the equations. For example,
columns (3) and (4) of table D.2 report the wage offsets for the level and
semilog specifications when only the expected accident compensation var-
iable, along with the dummies for occupations, years, and geography, are
included in the estimation. The same patterns are detected. Coal and lum-
ber experienced near or greater than dollar-for-dollar offsets, although the
lumber estimates are imprecise. Unionized building tradesmen experienced
no offsets.25
The samples cover a period of substantial change in American labor
markets. During World War I the federal government played a much larger
role in labor and product markets and the war led to substantial shocks
to labor and product markets. Nominal wages and the price level rose
sharply between 1916 and 1920 and both experienced sharp declines in
1921. Within labor markets the gap between skilled and unskilled wages
narrowed and the wages of southern and nonsouthern workers began to
converge. While the year, skill, and location dummy variables attempt to
control for these effects, another method is to limit the samples to the
period prior to 1916. The restricted sample captures the substantial
change in postaccident benefits associated with the adoption of workers'
compensation but avoids the large wage inflation and wage squeeze associ-
ated with U.S. participation in World War I. Comparisons of columns (5)
and (6) with columns (1) and (2) in table D.2 show that limiting the sample
to the early years does not substantially change the results. The coal wage
offset ranges between 1.56 and 2.28, while the lumber offset ranges
between 0.67 and 0.95. As before, the contractual wages in the build-
ing trades are generally unaffected by the expected benefits variable. These
results suggest that the wage offsets in the full samples are not driven by
the narrowing of regional or skilled-unskilled wage differentials during
World War J26
To further test the robustness of our central results, we limited the sam-
ple to states and years when workers' compensation was in effect. This
test serves a dual purpose. First, because our estimates of postaccident
compensation under negligence liability are less accurate than our mea-
sures for workers' compensation, focusing solely on the workers' compen-
sation observations is a way to reduce measurement error.27 Second, since
recent studies using modern data find wage offsets associated with more
generous workers' compensation benefits, we would expect to find a simi-
lar effect for labor markets in the early twentieth century. We can test the
reliability of our data by restricting our attention to the wage adjustment
associated with the variations in benefit levels under workers' compensa-
tion, ignoring the effect of the big change in expected compensation when
the laws were first introduced. As shown in columns (7) and (8) of table
D.2, the restricted samples produce the same general patterns found in the
full samples. Coal wages in fact show an offset that is larger than the one238Appendix E
from the full sample. The lumber offset in the linear case is larger than the
one from the full sample but not precisely estimated. The building trades
coefficients remain positive and are larger in magnitude and are statisti-
cally different from zero.
Appendix E
A Model of Insurance Consumption and Saving Behavior
How did the rise in postaccident benefits associated with workers' com-
pensation influence a household's decision to save for and insure against
a workplace accident? The answer to this question largely depends on
whether the worker's access to insurance was rationed or not. If a worker's
access to workplace accident insurance was not rationed, such that he
could freely buy his desired amount of insurance at a price below the op-
portunity cost of savings, he would have bought less insurance and saved
more when postaccident benefits increased. If, on the other hand, access
to insurance was limited, such that the worker faced a binding constraint
on the amount of insurance he could purchase, then increases in postacci-
dent benefits would have led him to reduce his saving.28 Increases in post-
accident benefits would have affected accident insurance purchases only
if the worker's new optimal level of insurance purchases fell below the
original binding constraint.
Modeling the Unconstrained Case
We capture the essential elements of the household's demand for sav-
ing and insurance using a two-period, expected-utility framework. In the
first period total household income includes the earnings of the house-
hold head, y, and other household income, denoted n, which might include
other family members' earnings and nonwage income, such as rent from
boarders. At the beginning of the second period, the household head
might have a workplace accident with probability q (0q1). If the
primary wage earner has no accident, then the family again receives y and
n in period 2. If the head of the household is killed on the job, the family
still earns n from other family members plus a postaccident payment of
C The family can adjust its income stream across time periods by saving
an amount s in period 1, which earns an interest rate r. The family can
also insure against the income loss from an accident by paying a premium
p that insures a payment of I if the household head is killed. We have
parameterized the model to treat the consumption goods as the numeraire.
The household's budget constraints can be written as follows:A Model of Insurance Consumption and Saving Behavior 239
n + y = x1 + p1 + sin period 1,
n + y + (1 + r)s = x2 in period 2 if no accident occurs, and
n + (1 + r)s + C + I = x2 in period 2 if an accident occurs.
Consumption in the first period is denoted x1, xis consumption in the
second period with no accident, and x2 is consumption in the second pe-
riod with an accident. The household's expected utility over the two peri-
ods can be written as
Z(x1, x2, x2) = U(x1) + (1 - q)V(x2) + qW(x2).
The use of different nonaccident utility functions (U and V) for the two
time periods implicitly reflects the household's discount rate. Different
second-period utility functions for the nonaccident (V) and accident (W)
states reflect lower utility for the same income when the family loses a
loved one to an accident (see Viscusi and Evans 1992). All three utility
functions are assumed to rise at a diminishing rate with increasing con-
sumption (i.e., U' > 0, V' > 0, W' > 0, U" < 0, V" < 0, and W" < 0).
After solving the budget constraints for x1, x2,,, and x2 and substitut-
ing them into the utility function, we can derive the comparative statics in
the case when insurance is not rationed. In this unconstrained setting, the
household chooses a saving level s and insurance purchases Ito maximize
the following objective function:
Z(s,I) = U(n + y-p1 - s) + (1 - q)V(n + y + (1 + r)s)
+ qW(n+ C+ I+(l+ r)s).
The first-order conditions for a maximum are
Z = U'(x1) + (1 + r)(l - q)V'(x2) + q(l + r)W'(x2) = 0,
Z1 = pU'(x1) + qW'(x2) = 0,
where Z and Z1 are the first derivatives of Z with respect to saving and
insurance, respectively. The first-order conditions imply that the house-
hold chooses saving and insurance levels such that the ratio of the mar-
ginal utility in the first period to the expected marginal utility in the sec-
ond period {U'(x1)f[(l - q)V'(x2,,) + qW'(x2)]} is equal to (1 + r) and the
ratio of the marginal utility in the first period to the marginal utility if an
accident occurs in the second period [U'(x1)fW'(x2)] is equal to the ratio
of the probability of an accident to the insurance premium (qfp).
The second-order conditions for a maximum are
Z = U"(x1) + (1 - q)V"(x2) + q(l + r)2W"(x2) < 0240Appendix E
and
Z11 = p2U"(x1) + qW"(x2) < 0.
zszJJ - zs > 0,
where
Z1= pU"(x1) + q(l + r)W"(x2) < 0
because U" < 0 and V" < 0.
Denote the demand functions for insurance and saving derived from
these first-order conditions as= n, r, p, q, C) and J* = I*(y, n, r,
p, q, C), respectively. The saving and insurance decisions become func-
tions of the income of the household head (y), the nonwage income and
income of other family members (n), the interest rate on saving (r), the
probability of a workplace accident (q), the premium paid for accident
insurance (p), and postaccident payments (C). Of course, these decisions
will also be influenced by differences in household preferences (particu-
larly rates of time preference), which might be based on the age of the
household head, the number and ages of children in the family, and the
skill levels of the workers in the household or their union status.
The comparative statics for changes in savings and insurance when post-
accident compensation changes (ds*IdC and dI*IdC) are
ds*IdC= ( Z Z11 + Z1 Z1 )I(Z Z11 - Z)
and
dI*IdC= Z1+ Z Z1 )I(ZZ11 - Z).
From the definition of a maximum and from the assumptions that U",
V", and W" are negative, the denominator of both equations is positive.
Therefore, the sign of the numerator determines the results.
= q(l + r)W"(x2) < 0
because W" < 0, and
Z1= qW"(x2) < 0
for the same reason.
Given this information, ZZ11 + Z1Z1 and ZZ1 + ZZ1 are
both ambiguous in sign at first glance. If we substitute in the values of the
derivatives, however, the signs of the above functions become clearer. The
sign of ds*IdC is determined by the sign of ZZ11 + Z1Z1 =
W"(X2a)U"(Xi) qp [1 - (1 + r)p], which is determined by the sign of [1 -
(1 + r) p1. This expression is positive as long asp is less than 1/(1 + r).
The sign of dI*IdC is similarly affected by the relationship between pA Model of Insurance Consumption and Saving Behavior 241
and 1/(1 + r). Its sign is determined by the sign of ZZ1 + ZZ1 =
I47"(x2) U" q[p (1 + r) - 1] - q(l - q) (1 + r)2 I47"(x2) V"(x2). Since the
second term is negative, the whole term will be negative ifp(l + r) - 1 <
0. When p is less than 1/(1 + r), the model predicts that dPIds is negative.
Thus, if the insurance premium p is less than 1/(1 + r), we should expect
that increases in postaccident compensation would lead to increases in
savings and reductions in insurance purchases in the unrationed model.
Historically, 1/(1 + r) was probably no smaller than 0.9 because interest
rates on saving rarely reached as high as 10 percent. Given that the proba-
bility of an accident was at most 0.2, and generally more like 0.02, the
insurance premium p would have been much lower than 0.9 if insurance
was actuarially fair. For the insurance premium p to exceed 1/(1 + r) the
load factor on insurance had to have been enormous or the insurance was
unavailable or rationed (in other words the premium at the margin was
infinite). In fact, if p exceeded 1/(1 + r), the worker could not achieve a
maximum because the first-order conditions would never hold. From the
first-order condition Z1 = 0, plq U"(x1) = W"(x2). Substitute this into the
first-order condition Z = 0 and simplify, then U'(x3[l - (1 + r)p] =
(1 + r)(l - q)V'(x2). By assumption U', V', (1 + r), and (1 - q) must
be positive; therefore, [1 - (1 + r)p] must be positive for the first-order
conditions to hold.
Comparative Statics in the Constrained Model
The comparative statical results change markedly when we assume that
insurance purchases were rationed. Insurance companies, in response
to problems with adverse selection, often establish maximums for the
amount of insurance people can buy and in some cases sell no insurance
at all. If this constraint is binding, the worker faces a maximization prob-
lem with the extra constraint that insurance purchases I equal the maxi-
mum M. The maximization problem then becomes a Lagrangian with an
objective function,
X(s, I, u) = U(n + y-p1 - s) + (1 - q)V(n + y + (1 + r)s)
+ qW(n + C + I + (1 + r)s) + u(M - 1),
where M is the maximum amount of insurance allowed by the insurance
companies and u is a LaGrangian multiplier.
The first-order conditions for a maximum are
= U'(x1) + (1 + r)(l - q)V'(x2) + q(l + r)W'(x2) = 0,
= pU'(x1) + qW'(x2) - u = 0,
= (M - 1).242Appendix E
The choice functions for insurance and saving derived from these first-
order conditions are now Sc = s'(y, n, r, p, q, C, M) and I"Ic(y, n, r,p,
q, C, M), and Uc = u"(y, n, r, p, q, C, M). X, X11, and X are all negative
(they are the same as the expressionsZ11, and Z1 above). Also, X =
O,X1,= 1,andX=O.
The comparative statics show that increases in postaccident benefits (C)
cause workers to save less. The sign of dS*fdC is determined by the sign of
= q(l + r)W"(x2a),
which is less than zero because W' is negative. The binding constraint on
insurance purchases also leads to the result that insurance purchases are
unaffected by changes in postaccident compensation (dI*fdC = 0). How-
ever, this presumes that the insurance constraint remains binding. It is
possible that the optimal level of insurance could fall below the constraint,
in which case the impact of higher postaccident compensation would be
to lower insurance purchases again.
We can also derive comparative statics for the impact on savings and
insurance when insurance companies raise the maximum amount of insur-
ance allowed. The impact on insurance (dI* 1dM) is determined by the sign
of X, which is greater than zero; therefore, increases in the maximums
lead workers to purchase more insurance. The impact on savings (dS*IdM)
is determined by the sign of Xx,, which is negative; therefore, increases in
the insurance maximum lead workers to save less.
The intuition underlying the differences in the saving response in the
unconstrained and rationed cases is relatively simple. If insurance were
not rationed and priced near actuarial fairness, the worker would have
found it much less costly to buy accident insurance than to use saving for
insurance purchases. An increase in postaccident benefits would allow him
to purchase lower amounts of insurance, freeing funds for more saving
and consumption. If accident insurance, on the other hand, were con-
strained at the maximum, then saving would have been a more reasonable
means of insuring against the risk of an accident, and increases in postac-
cident compensation would have led to reductions in saving.
Recasting the Models Incorporating Compensating Wage
Differentials in Response to a Rise in Expected Benefits
We have also reformulated the model to include the presence of com-
pensating differentials in wages in response to the change in the postacci-
dent payment C. In that case, income y can become a function of C, y(C),
where y'(C) < 0. When insurance is unconstrained and relatively inexpen-
sive [p < 1/(1 + r)], the more complicated model predicts that saving
would rise whenever postaccident payments rise. When insurance is ra-Effect of Benefits on Saving and Insurance Behavior 243
tioned, the model predicts that saving could either fall or rise when post-
accident payments rise. Thus, even under compensating differentials, the
only setting in which saving would be expected to fall with a rise in postac-
cident compensation is when there are limitations on the availability of in-
surance.
Appendix F
An Econometric Analysis of the Effect of Increased
Expected Benefits on Saving and Insurance Behavior
This appendix reports the results of a regression analysis of how variations
in expected postaccident benefits on the part of working-class families
influenced precautionary saving and private insurance coverage (see Kan-
tor and Fishback 1996). We use cross-sectional data on families' financial
decisions in both workers' compensation states and negligence liability
states. Between late 1917 and early 1919 the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS) conducted an intricate analysis of the consumption patterns of
working-class families in industrial centers of the United States. The study
established the budget weights for the consumer price index (U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics 1924). Agents interviewed 12,817 families of wage earn-
ers or salaried workers in ninety-nine cities in forty-two states. Although
the BLS believed that the survey families fairly represented the urban pop-
ulation at the time, the investigation was limited in a number of important
ways. The interviewers surveyed only households of wage and salary earn-
ers where both spouses and one or more children were present. The sala-
ried workers were not to earn more than two thousand dollars a year and
the families had to reside in the same community for a year prior to the
survey. Further, the BLS excluded families with more than three boarders,
"slum" families, charity families, and non-English-speaking families who
had been in the United States less than five years. As a result, craft workers
and other high-wage workers were oversampled relative to factory opera-
tives and laborers.
We imposed some additional limits on the sample, restricting it to labor-
ers, operatives, and craft workers for several reasons. First, domestic ser-
vice workers and farm workers were excluded because workers' compensa-
tion laws usually exempted these occupations from coverage. Second, we
eliminated managers, professionals and semiprofessionals, salesmen, and
clerical workers because our measure of accident risk largely pertains to
the workers directly involved in the defining activities of that industry.29
The exclusions reduce measurement error because the managerial, sales,
and clerical workers were typically not exposed to the same accident risk244Appendix F
as manufacturing workers. Third, men working in the maritime industry
were eliminated from the sample because the nature of their postaccident
compensation was in a state of flux at the time of the survey.30 Fourth,
railroad workers were eliminated because of inadequate information on
their postaccident compensation. Railroad workers typically fared better
than nonrailroad workers under negligence liability because employers
could not invoke the fellow servant and contributory negligence defenses
after 1908. However, because interstate railroad workers were not covered
under workers' compensation, we are uncertain how they fared relative to
nonrailroad workers when the laws were enacted. Fifth, government work-
ers were eliminated because the status of postaccident compensation for
these workers was poorly defined in many states.31 After all of these restric-
tions to the original sample, we were left with a total of 7,475 observations.
The cost-of-living survey contains information on household purchases
of accident and life insurance and household saving. "Saving" is defined
as the household's total income minus its total expenditures. The BLS sur-
vey asked the family how many people in the household had accident insur-
ance. In the sample 90 percent responded that no one had accident in-
surance, 9.4 percent responded that at least one person had accident
insurance, and only 0.6 percent responded that more than one person had
insurance. Presumably, most households with just one accident insurance
policy were insuring the household head, the primary wage earner. We
used this information to create a dummy variable taking the value of one
if the household held one or more accident insurance policies, and zero
otherwise.
The BLS also asked about the number of household members with five
different types of life insurance: old-line (whole life), fraternal, industrial,
establishment, and other types. Because life insurance covered so many
more people within the household than accident insurance, the life insur-
ance variable by necessity focuses on the purchases of life insurance for
all members of the household. We used the information to create a dummy
variable valued at one if the household claimed at least one life insurance
policy, and zero otherwise. Given the zero-one nature of the variables we
estimated probit equations.
The insurance and saving functions that we estimate can be derived
from the first-order conditions in appendix E or from extensions of the
models that Leland (1968) and Kotlikoff (1989) developed. In such a
model the demands for insurance and precautionary saving would be
affected by the expected postaccident benefit, accident risk, the interest
rate, and income. We included other demand variables pertaining more
specifically to the household's financial status. Thus, the regressions in-
clude the wife's annual earnings, the children's earnings, income from
boarding and lodging, net income from rent and interest, and the number
of children between ages zero and four, five and nine, ten and fourteen,Effect of Benefits on Saving and Insurance Behavior 245
and older than fourteen. Moreover, following Haines(1985),our empirical
models include a number of variables designed to capture differences in
the utility functions across households. We control for possible life-cycle
effects by including the age and age squared of the household head, and
we include dummy variables controlling for his occupational skill level and
whether he contributed to a labor organization. To capture differences in
the cost of living that households faced, we included an index of the aver-
age cost of living in urban areas in each state for the period1919to1921.
We also included regional dummy variables to capture geographic differ-
ences in interest rates caused by differences in banking regulations and dif-
ferences in insurance premiums caused by state-specific regulations or vary-
ing costs of selling and monitoring policies across the country.
To measure the workplace accident risk that each worker in the sample
faced, we matched each worker's industry with the premium paid per one
hundred dollars on the payroll thatemployersin that industry were re-
quired to pay into the Ohio State Workmen's Compensation Fund in1923.
Note that this premium is not the one that workers paid for personal life
or accident insurance. We chose the Ohio information because Ohio had
a wider range of industries than any other state where premiums were avail-
able. The premiums that employers paid should be correlated with fatal
and nonfatal accident risk in the workplace because the Ohio Industrial
Commission sought to price the insurance so that industries paid for the
accident costs they generated. To some extent, this accident risk measure
should be correlated with the accident insurance premium that a worker
would have paid for private accident insurance, which was priced accord-
ing to his particular industry and occupation.
To calculate a worker's expected postaccident compensation, we fol-
lowed the procedures described in appendix B. In this case we used the
worker's actual wage to calculate the expected benefits.
Coefficient estimates and t-statistics from the probit estimations of life
and accident insurance coverage and ordinary least squares estimation of
the saving equation are presented in table F. 1. To calculate the impact of
a one-standard-deviation change in each of the independent variables on
the life insurance and accident insurance probabilities, we followed the
standard procedure of translating probit coefficients into marginal effects.
That is, we calculated a baseline probability of purchasing insurance by
setting the independent variables at their sample means and the dummy
variables equal to zero. We then computed the change in the baseline prob-
ability caused by a one-standard-deviation change in each independent
variable, holding all others constant at their sample means. The marginal
effects of the dummy variables represent shifts from zero to one.
The coefficient of the expected-benefits variable in the life insurance
probit is negative, but it is not statistically significant. A one-standard-
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lowered the probability of purchasing life insurance by only 0.1 percentage
pointfrom 86.1 percent to 86.2 percentwhen evaluated at the inde-
pendent variables' sample means.32 Changes in expected accident benefits
had more influence on the probability of purchasing accident insurance,
as a one-standard-deviation change in the benefits would have lowered the
probability of purchasing accident insurance by a statistically significant
1.9 percentage points.
The coefficient on expected benefits in the saving regression in column
(4) of the table indicates that each dollar increase in expected benefits
was associated with a reduction in saving of $1.62, which is statistically
significantly different from zero.33 To get a sense of the general magnitude
of a switch from negligence liability to workers' compensation, consider a
worker who moved from Virginia, where negligence liability was still in
force, to the neighboring workers' compensation state of Maryland. All
else equal, his expected postaccident benefits would have risen by approxi-
mately eleven dollars. Such an increase would have allowed him to reduce
his precautionary saving by $17.82, or about 25 percent of the mean level
of saving in the sample.
The $1.62 estimate may understate the full macroeconomic effect of in-
troducing workers' compensation because income is held constant in the
saving regression. If, as we argue in chapter 3, workers paid for increases
in postaccident benefits in the form of lower wages, then the reduction
in earnings associated with the adoption of workers' compensation itself
probably led to reduced saving. Consider a situation in which the house-
hold head experienced a wage offset that lowered his annual earnings by
the full increase in his expected postaccident benefits. The coefficient on
the household head's income in the table implies that saving would have
fallen an additional $0.202 for each dollar increase in expected postacci-
dent benefits, thus raising the overall impact on saving to $1.82.
We have performed several tests to ensure that the estimated impact of
changes in postaccident benefits on saving behavior is not spurious. There
may be worries that the regional dummy variables are capturing some of
the impact of workers' compensation, so we have estimated the equation
without the regional dummies. The coefficient of the expected-benefits
variable is slightly smaller at 1.16 and remains statistically significant.
It should be noted, however, that F-tests reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients of the regional dummy variables are simultaneously zero.
Another potential criticism is that states without workers' compensa-
tion in 1918 tended to be southern states, where saving might have been
lower. Further, there may be questions about measurement error in the
nonworkers' compensation states because we could not rely on explicit
laws to estimate the expected accident benefits in such states. Such con-
cerns are unfounded, however. The saving regression includes income and
regional dummies that should control for this effect. Further, we estimated250Appendix F
the saving equation on a sample that eliminated the nonworkers' com-
pensation states and the expected-benefits coefficient was actually some-
what larger at 2.24, with a t-statistic of 5.48.
Another more serious concern is that the BLS survey was taken during
World War I, which was a period of substantial upheaval in the economy.
The government became heavily involved in labor markets and the econ-
omy experienced substantial demand and supply shocks that were prob-
ably unevenly distributed geographically. The saving result potentially
could be spurious if these shocks were correlated in some way with the
generosity of workers' compensation benefits across states. We have tested
for this possibility by estimating the saving regression on an alternative
sample of households from the BLS survey that would have been largely
unaffected by the expected benefits under workers' compensation. In this
sample we included professional and clerical workers who did not face
the risks that operatives, workers, and craftsmen faced, domestic service
workers who were not covered by workers' compensation, federal govern-
ment workers who were covered under federal workers' compensation law,
and railroad workers who were involved in interstate commerce and were
covered under an entirely different set of liability rules. For each worker
in this alternative sample we calculated his expected benefits as if he were
covered under his state's workers' compensation law and faced the same
accident risk as that of manufacturing operatives and skilled workers in
his particular industry. Given that these households' saving decisions were
not in actuality affected by the generosity of their states' workers' compen-
sation programs, we would expect to find that the expected-benefits vari-
able would have a small and statistically insignificant effect on saving.
That is exactly what we find. The expected-benefits coefficient when re-
gional dummies are included is small at 0.56, roughly one-third the size
of the coefficient in the table, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
coefficient is zero (t-statistic of 0.76). In an equation with the regional
dummies excluded, the coefficient is 0.21, and again statistically insignifi-
cant (t-statistic of 0.42).
Most of the other variables in the table tended to affect saving and in-
surance as expected. The age variables indicate that saving and insurance
purchases increased at a diminishing rate with age, but the coefficients are
not statistically significant. A husband's higher earnings were associated
with more saving and insurance coverage, while the earnings of other
household members had a positive effect on saving, but varied effects on
accident insurance purchases. Households also saved less as they had
more older children. For example, an additional child between the ages of
zero and four lowered saving by seventeen dollars, but one more child
older than fifteen years reduced saving by thirty-seven dollars. This result
may be driven by the fact that saving is measured as a residual (household
income minus expenditures), and older children may have consumed morein terms of food and clothing. Alternatively, the result might be interpreted
as evidence that families used children as substitutes for precautionary
saving. Having children in the household who could be sent to work in
case of financial hardship meant that families did not have to rely so heav-
ily on saving as a means of insurance.
Appendix G
Employers' Liability Laws
Employers' liability laws were a group of statutes that outlined the liability
of employers for workplace accidents. Because of the wide range of such
laws (Clark 1908) we have classified them into several types: laws that had
an impact on employers' liability for most nonrailroad workers in the state
(these are the laws summarized in table 4.1), laws that restated the com-
mon law for all workers, laws that influenced the liability of railroad em-
ployers, laws that assigned liability to mineowners for willful violations of
the mine safety laws, laws that specified employers' liability in mining, and
laws that outlawed contracts in which workers' waived their liability.
In determining the classification of laws we began with Clark (1908) to
get a picture of the situation as of 1907. We went backward in time and
examined the laws as of 1900, as reported by Fessenden (1900, 1157-210).
We then went forward in time and reexamined the laws again as of 1913,
using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1914) and then once again reexam-
ined the laws as of 1925 using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1925a). For
states where there were changes in the law, we examined when the changes
were made (often the date of the change was listed in these sources). These
laws are complex and in some cases interpreting them requires a heavy
reliance on court interpretations; other scholars might choose to reclassify
some of our designations.
Laws That Affected Employers' Liability for Nonrailroad Workers
Often employers' liability laws are lumped into one category. In a num-
ber of states the employers' liability law referred specifically to railroading
or mining, while in other states the law was more general. Railroad work-
ers were covered by the Federal Employers' Liability Acts of 1906 and
1908 if they were involved in interstate commerce. Given that workers'
compensation was focused more on nonrailroad workers, we feel it impor-
tant to identify a separate class of laws that were general or focused on
manufacturing. In this grouping of laws, for which annual totals are given
in table 4.1, we have tried to focus on those laws that we felt increased the
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liability of employers. There was a class of laws that restated the common
law and thus probably had no impact on the liability of employers, and we
have grouped those in a separate category.
The states with laws that appear to have affected employer liability for
nonrailroad workers include Alabama (pre-1900), Arizona (1912), Arkan-
sas (1913), California (1907), Colorado (pre-1900, 1901), Indiana (pre-
1900, 1911), Idaho (1909), Iowa (1907), Kansas (1903 and 1909), Louisi-
ana (pre-1900), Maine (1909), Massachusetts (1902, 1909), Mississippi
(1896 ending in 1903, 1910), Nebraska (1913), Nevada (1905), New Jersey
(1910), New York (1902), Ohio (1902, 1904, 1910), Oklahoma (1907), Ore-
gon (1907), Pennsylvania (1907), Utah (pre-1900), Vermont (1910), Wash-
ington (1903), Wisconsin (1906), and Wyoming (pre-1900).
Alabama, Colorado, Massachusetts, and New York had detailed em-
ployers' liability laws that described contributory negligence, the fellow
servant defense, and assumption of risk in detail and seemed to be more
than just a restatement of the common law. Colorado in 1901 limited the
fellow servant defense. Massachusetts in 1909 further altered the employ-
ers' defenses by establishing comparative negligence and limits on liability
The Arizona Constitution of 1912 and consequent legislation in 1912 ab-
rogated the fellow servant defense and established comparative negligence.
Utah specified in detail who was considered a fellow servant. Indiana es-
tablished that the burden of proof for contributory negligence was on the
defendant prior to 1900 and then in 1911 set up a more-detailed employ-
ers' liability law. Iowa in 1907 established an assumption of risk law that
ensured that if an employee notified the employer of a defect in machinery,
the employee had not assumed the risk if he continued to work on the
machine. Louisiana had a very broad statement that seemed to limit the
fellow servant defense because it was based on the Napoleonic Code. In
1912 Louisiana further limited the assumption of risk defense. Mississippi
established comparative negligence in 1910. In 1896 Mississippi enacted a
law that tried to expand its railroad employers' liability law to apply to all
corporations but it was struck down as unconstitutional in 1903 (Clark
1908, 114). Oklahoma's Constitution of 1907 stated that the fellow servant
defense was not applicable in mining and railroading. Oklahoma also es-
tablished that a jury was to decide as a question of fact whether the as-
sumption of risk and/or contributory negligence defenses applied; there-
fore, we classified it as having an impact on liability Alabama, Indiana,
and Pennsylvania imposed limits on the fellow servant defense. Wyoming's
constitution disallowed laws that would limit the amount of damages to
be recovered by an injured person. Idaho in 1909 established a general
employers' liability bill, as did Vermont in 1910. Maine's 1909 law seemed
to cover both nonrailroad and railroad employers. Nevada had a statute
similar to Connecticut, which restated the common law, although it was
stated differently enough that we have classified it as having an impact on
employers' liability.Ohio established a statute making the employer liable for accidents that
resulted from their failure to follow the inspection statutes; in 1904 the
state limited assumption of risk; and in 1910 Ohio established comparative
negligence and limited the fellow servant defense. Oregon, Washington,
and Wisconsin as part of their factory inspection laws made the employer
liable for failure to comply with the factory inspection. In Kansas, the
statute requiring the installation of fire escapes and safety devices in man-
ufacturing establishments authorized an action for injuries or death from
the employer's disregard of the act. Kansas in 1909 later established a
factory act like the ones in Washington and Oregon. Nebraska passed a
1913 statute that was similar to the ones in Oregon, Washington, and Wis-
consin. Although Rhode Island and New Jersey (in the 1890s) had statutes
for fire escapes and elevators, we did not treat them as a main employers'
liability law because of their limited focus. New Jersey in 1910 established
a general employers' liability act. Arkansas set up comparative negligence
and limited assumption of risk in 1913. Colorado in 1911 imposed aliabil-
ity maximum of five thousand dollars and added a factory inspection
clause that imposed liability for noncompliance. Florida in 1913 passed
a law establishing comparative negligence and disallowing contracts
whereby workers waived their right to sue in the railroad, street railway,
telephone and telegraph, boating, and blasting industries. However, we
treated this Florida law as primarily a railroad law.
Laws That Restated the Common Law
Clark (1908) claimed that Arizona, California, Connecticut (1902),
Georgia, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Da-
kota (pre-1900) all had statutes or constitutional provisions that simply
restated the common law, without expanding employers' liability.
Employers' Liability for Willful Failure to Follow Mining Statutes
The following states included in their mining regulations a statement
that willful violation of the mining statute could lead to a rightful claim
for damages: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Maryland (1902), Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah (1905), Washington, and Wyoming.
We treat this type of employers' liability law as a separate category specific
to mining. All of the laws were enacted prior to 1900 unless another year
is noted in parentheses.
General Employers' Liability Laws Specific to Mines
Maryland (1902), Missouri (1907), Nevada (1907), and Oklahoma
(1907) all had general liability laws for the mining industry.
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Laws Preventing Workers from Signing Contracts
Waiving Rights to Negligence Suit Prior to Injury
States with laws preventing such ex ante contracts in railroading in-
cluded Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Nevada (1907), New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia,
and Wisconsin. States with general laws were Alabama (1907), Arkansas
(1913), California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho (1909), Indiana, Massachu-
setts, Missouri (mining only), Montana, Nevada (1907 for railroading,
mining, and milling), Ohio (1910), and Wyoming (constitution).
Employers' Liability Laws for Railroads
The states with employers' liability laws for the railroad industry in-
cluded Arkansas (pre-1900), Colorado (pre-1900), Delaware (1903), Flor-
ida (pre-1900), Georgia (pre-1900), Illinois (pre-1900), Indiana (1901),
Iowa (pre-1900), Kansas (pre-1900), Kentucky (1903), Maine (1905), Mas-
sachusetts (pre-1900), Michigan (1909), Minnesota (pre-1900), Mississippi
(pre-1900), Missouri (pre-1900), Montana (pre-1900), Nebraska (pre-
1900), Nevada (1907), New Mexico (pre-1900), New York (1906), North
Carolina (pre-1900), North Dakota (pre-1900), Ohio (pre-1900), Okla-
homa (1907), Oregon (1903), South Carolina (pre-1900), South Dakota
(1907), Texas (pre-1900), Vermont (pre-1900), Virginia (1902), Washing-
ton (pre-1900), Wisconsin (pre-1900), and Wyoming (1913).
Appendix H
Discrete-Time Hazard Analysis of the Timing
of Adoption across the United States
In chapter 4 we discuss how the timing of adoption across states was in-
fluenced by interest group pressure, changes in the climate of employers'
liability, and political reform movements. In the text we show comparisons
of mean values of various factors that influenced adoption for states
adopting prior to 1913, between 1913 and 1916, and after 1916. It is im-
portant to remember, however, that all of these factors are influencing the
adoption process at the same time. Thus, we must look at the impact of
these factors on adoption from a multivariate perspective. This section
provides the statistical background for the statements made in chapter
4, section 4.3. The analysis was first reported in Fishback and Kantor
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To examine the marginal impact of each factor on the probability of
adoption, we estimated an equation summarizing the first-time adoption
decisions by state legislatures between 1909 and 1930 using a discrete-time
hazard model with time-varying covariates (Allison 1984, 16-22; Yama-
guchi 1991, 16-24):
ln(p(t;X)I[l - p(t;X)]) = a + bX + e,
where p(t; X) is the conditional probability of adoption at a discrete point
in time t given that the event did not occur prior to time t and given the
covariate vector X (which includes variables measuring the liability en-
vironment, interest group strength, and the political climate); b is a 1 X k
vector of coefficients for the k x 1 covariate vector X; a is the log-odds of
a baseline group where the vector X is all zeroes; and e is an error term.34
We chose the discrete-time hazard model because there were significant
discontinuities in the opportunities for legislatures to adopt the legislation.
The legislatures could only adopt the law when they met, and most legisla-
tures met every other year.
Table H. 1 presents the variables' economic impacts on the probability
of adopting workers' compensation, based on the coefficients from the
discrete-time hazard model.35 For the continuous variables the impact rep-
resents the marginal effect on the probability of adopting workers' com-
pensation (in year t, given that the state had not already adopted the law)
caused by a one-standard-deviation (OSD) increase in each independent
variable, holding all others constant at their sample means. The marginal
effects of the dummy variables show the change in the probability when
the dummy variables switch from zero to one. Note that a positive effect
implies that an increase in the variable leads to a higher probability of
enacting the legislation. The absolute value oft-statistics of the coefficients
from the hazard model are reported in parentheses to allow the reader to
assess the statistical significance of the original hypothesis tests on the
coefficients from the model. In the discussion below we focus on the results
in column (1).
Changes in the Legal Environment Governing Accident Compensation
There are several signs that changes in the employers' liability climate
influenced the timing of first adoption by state legislatures. The presence
of an employers' liability law for nonrailroad workers that altered one or
more of the three common law defenses raised the probability of adopting
workers' compensation by a statistically significant 7.9 percentage points.
In contrast, the presence of a law that restated the common law without
truly expanding the employers' liability law had only a small and statisti-
cally insignificant effect on the probability of adoption.Variables
Mean
(std. dev.)
Impact of Changes on the
Probability of Enacting
Workers' Compensation




Baseline probability 0.043 0.043
Changes in workplace accident liability
Employers' liability law limiting 0.430 0.079 0.078
common law defenses (0.496) (2.27) (2.21)
Employers' liability law 0.157 0.002 -0.0001
restating the common law (0.365) (0.05) (0.004)
Ratio of employers' liability 0.113 0.036 0.039
and accident insurance
premiums to life insurance
premiums
(0.048) (2.39) (2.49)
Index of workplace accident 1.897 0.023 0.020
supreme court cases (2.63) (1.97) (1.71)
(1904-6 = 1) lagged one year
Manufacturing accident risk 1.789 0.0 13 0.006
index (0.659) (0.60) (0.29)
Interest group influence
Percentage of workers in 7.44 -0.016 -0.015
manufacturing establishments
with less than 5 workers
(6.37) (0.89) (0.77)
Percentage of workers in 23.7 0.047 0.044
manufacturing establishments
with more than 500 workers
(11.0) (1.92) (1.77)
Manufacturing value added per 4.451 0.049 0.054
worker (thousands; constant (1.39) (1.96) (2.06)
1967 dollars)
Percentage of labor force 22.12 0.076 0.086
employed in manufacturing (11.08) (1.78) (1.89)
Percentage of labor force 2.32 0.002 0.001
employed in mining (3.61) (0.12) (0.06)
Manufacturing unionization 9.484 0.110 0.102
index (4.604) (3.03) (2.84)








Table H.! Economic Impact of Changes in Variables on the Probability of
Adopting Workers' Compensation, 1909-30, Derived from Parameters
Estimated in Discrete-Time Hazard ModelDiscrete-Time Hazard Analysis of the Timing of Adoption257
Table H.! (continued)
Sources: Fishback and Kantor (1998a, 322-23). See appendix I.
Note: The information covers the forty-eight states for the period 1909 to 1930 when the
state legislatures met up until the year of adoption by the legislature in each state, with a
total of 242 state-years.
aThe impact of changes for continuous variables is based on a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in each of the continuous variables, holding the other variables constant at their sam-
ple means. The marginals of the dummy variables are based on switches from 0 to 1, centered
at the mean for the variable, holding all else constant. The baseline probability was computed
at the sample means of all the variables. The t-statistics in parentheses are the ones from the
estimated coefficients of the discrete-time hazard model; they cannot be used to construct
confidence intervals for the measures of the impact of the variables.
A rise in the supreme court case index, our measure of increased legal
uncertainty, was associated with a statistically significant increase in the
probability of adopting workers' compensation. An OSD increase in the
index increased a state's probability of enacting the legislation by 2.3 per-
centage points.
To capture the expansion in employers' liability insurance premiums
and greater interest in insurance purchases, we included the ratio of em-
ployers' liability insurance premiums to life insurance premiums that were
collected by commercial insurance companies in each state. Consistent




Impact of Changes on the
Probability of Enacting
Workers' Compensation





Power shift in at least one 0.132 0.078 0.071
branch of legislature (0.339) (1.59) (1.48)
Power shift in both branches 0.083 0.009 0.0 13
of legislature (0.399) (0.17) (0.25)
Progressive law index 4.65 0.019 0.012
(1.82) (1.13) (0.70)
Progressive vote for Roosevelt 15.60 0.093 0.083
in 1912 presidential election (10.37) (3.77) (3.37)
Percent of presidential vote for 3.673 0.010 0.012
socialist (3.296) (0.55) (0.64)
Southern state dummy variable 0.541 0.074 0.069
(0.499) (1.82) (1.66)
"Contagion effect"
Percentage of nearby states
that had adopted workers' 0.277 0.0 16
compensation t - 1 (0.3 16) (1.03)258Appendix H
workers' compensation, an OSD increase in the insurance ratio raised the
adoption probability by a statistically significant 3.6 percentage points.36
To examine the impact of the shift in manufacturing employment to-
ward more dangerous jobs, we created an accident risk index based on
the manufacturing industrial mix in each state. Shifts of manufacturing
employment into more dangerous industries did not appear to stimulate
earlier adoption of the law. The risk index had a small and statistically
insignificant impact on the probability of adopting workers' compensa-
tion. This result may imply that greater public awareness of accident risk
was not nearly as important as changes in the employers' liability climate.
Interest Group Influence
Greater strength of the manufacturing lobby raised the probability of
adoption. In states where the manufacturing share of employment was
OSD higher than the mean, the probability of adoption was a statistically
significant 7.6 percentage points higher. A greater presence of large firms
and more productive firms also increased the probability of adopting
workers' compensation. Within the manufacturing lobby, an OSD increase
in the percentage of establishments with over five hundred workers raised
the likelihood of adoption by 4.7 percentage points, while an OSD in-
crease in manufacturing value added raised the probability of adoption by
4.9 percentage points. Meanwhile, an OSD increase in the percentage of
workers in firms with less than five workers, the types of firms typically
exempted from the law, had a small negative but statistically insignificant
impact on the probability of adoption.
Organized labor joined manufacturing interests in strongly supporting
the passage of workers' compensation. We developed a union index in
each state, which reflects the degree to which the industries represented in
the state were unionized at the national level. An OSD increase in the
union percentage increased the probability of adopting the law by 11.0
percentage points, and the effect is statistically significant.
To measure the general strength of the insurance lobby, we included the
total life insurance premiums paid (in 1967 dollars) divided by the number
of workers in the state. The life insurance premiums per worker had virtu-
ally no impact on the probability of adopting workers' compensation. Fi-
nally, an OSD increase in state spending on labor issues had a small (-1.6
percentage point) and statistically insignificant impact on the probability
of adoption.
Political Climate
We examine the impact of the Progressive Movement with four mea-
sures: the electorate's support for socialist presidential candidates, the sup-Discrete-Time Hazard Analysis of the Timing of Adoption259
port for Theodore Roosevelt's progressive presidential candidacy in 1912,
variables that measure shifts in party control of state legislatures, and an
index of progressive laws that each state had adopted to date.
The percentage of the vote won by Theodore Roosevelt's progressive
presidential campaign offers a rough measure of the extent to which vot-
ers in each state supported the nationwide progressive platform in 1912.
An OSD increase in the percent voting for Roosevelt raised the probability
of adopting workers' compensation in any one year by 9.3 percentage
points.37 It should be noted, however, that the support for socialist candi-
dates had only a very small effect on the probability of adoption, and we
cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect.
One way to capture the effect of reform movements at the state level is
to measure their success in adopting other forms of progressive legislation.
Therefore, we developed an index of progressive legislation that each state
had in place at any point in time. The index measures the number of laws
from the following list of progressive proposals that the state had passed:
ballot initiatives, referenda, direct primaries, a mothers' pension law, a
state tax commission, compulsory school attendance legislation, a state
welfare agency, a merit system for state employees, a minimum age for
child labor, and a state commission to regulate electricity rates. An OSD
increase in the progressive law index raised the probability of adoption by
1.9 percentage points, but the effect was not statistically significant.
Another way to capture the effect of reform movements is to create
dummy variables that track the major political party shifts occurring
within each state's legislature. The first legislative power shift variable
takes a value of one if in at least one branch of state i's legislature, the
majority party of the previous session lost its majority coming into year
t's session.38 When only one branch changed parties, it typically produced
a situation in which different parties controlled each of the state's two
legislative chambers.39 The second dummy variable has a value of one if
both branches of the legislature experienced a political power shift. For
every double-chamber power shift in the sample, both chambers always
shifted to the same party. We would expect that the probability of enacting
workers' compensation would have increased if both branches of a state's
legislature experienced a power shift, because otherwise each branch
would have had veto power over the decisions of the other.4° A single-
chamber power shift increased the probability of adoption by 7.8 percent-
age points, but we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect. A double-
chamber shift had a very small influence on the probability of adoption.
The analysis also includes a southern dummy variable to control for any
"southern" effect that is not already captured by the other independent
variables. States in the South were more likely to adopt workers' compen-
sation, holding the other factors constant.4'260Appendix I
"Contagion" Effect
When workers' compensation was first being considered, employers
raised concerns that the legislation would put them at a cost disadvantage
relative to their competitors in neighboring states. Given this attitude, em-
ployers may have been more willing to endorse workers' compensation
when they were assured that their rivals in other states had similar labor
costs. In an attempt to measure such a "contagion" effect, we reestimated
the hazard equation including a variable that measures the proportion of
nearby states that had adopted workers' compensation by the end of year
t - 1.42 The results, reported in column (2) of table H.l, suggest that states
were more likely to enact workers' compensation if nearby states had
adopted before them. An OSD change in the contagion variable raised the
probability of adopting the law by only 1.6 percentage points, however,
and the coefficient from the hazard analysis is not statistically significant.43
Comparisons of the two columns of results in the table show that inclusion
of the contagion effect has relatively little impact on the other findings.
Appendix I
Data Sources and Descriptions of Quantitative Variables
This appendix describes the sources of the variables used in the state panel
that underlies the comparisons of means in chapter 4 and the hazard
model analysis reported in appendix H.
Workers' Compensation Laws
The years in which states enacted their workers' compensation laws and
the details of the laws described in various chapters throughout the book
come from Clark and Frincke (1921), Hookstadt (1918, 1919, 1920, 1922),
Jones (1927), U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletins 126 (1913b), 203
(1917), 243 (1918), 332 (1923), 423 (1926b), and 496 (1929), and from
closer inspection of the state statutes for the timing of changes in the vari-
ous parameters of the law.
Variables Characterizing Employers' Liability Laws
Information on the status of each state's employers' liability laws was
collected from a variety of sources: Fessenden (1900, 1 157-210), U.S. De-
partment of Labor (1903, 1363-64), Clark (1908 and 1911, 904-11), and
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletins 111 (1913a), 148 (1914), and 370
(1925a). See also appendix G.Insurance Measures
The employers' liability and accident insurance premiums that were col-
lected in each state are reported in the Spectator Company's Insurance
Year Book, 1900 through 1930. For many states there were not separate
listings for accident and employers' liability insurance, which is why we
have combined the two types of insurance. Although the Year Book was
published each year, the volumes sometimes did not contain information
for the current year, but repeated data from an earlier year. When data
were missing in the years before workers' compensation was introduced,
we filled the gaps using a straight-line interpolation of the years sur-
rounding the missing year. In some cases the employers' liability and ac-
cident insurance data were missing for the year of adoption. In that case
we estimated the data using an extrapolation procedure in which we
multiplied the ratio of accident and employers' liability insurance to life
insurance from the previous year and multiplied that ratio by the amount
of life insurance sold during the year of adoption. We could not use
straight-line interpolation to estimate the value for the adoption year be-
cause workers' compensation dramatically changed the nature of the em-
ployers' liability insurance market.
The life insurance premiums are the sum of ordinary and industrial
life insurance premiums, also from the Year Book. For years with missing
insurance premium data, we multiplied the reported life-insurance-in-
force measure by the ratio of premiums to insurance-in-force over the pe-
riod for which we had data. In some cases we still had missing data, be-
cause insurance-in-force was not reported, so we filled those years with
straight-line interpolations between adjacent years. We deflated the life
insurance premiums using the CPI (1967 = 100).
Index of Workplace Accident Supreme Court Cases
The index of state supreme court cases dealing with workplace acci-
dents is based on counting all nonrailroad, street railroad, and railroad
nontrain cases in each state's supreme court reporter. In searching for
cases, we began with the following headings in the reporters indexes:
master-servant liability, negligence, employer liability, assumption of risk,
fellow servant, contributory negligence, personal injuries, and other head-
ings referenced in those. We read each case to ensure that it dealt with a
workplace accident and not, for example, a dispute over wages. For each
state, we then created an index that used the average number of cases from
1904-6 as the base. We use an index of the cases, instead of the actual
number of cases adjudicated in our adoption regression equation, because
there were differences in the structure of court systems across states that
might have led to differences in the number of cases reaching the state
supreme court level.
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We eliminated railroad train cases because railroad workers who were
injured in the course of interstate commerce after 1908 were covered under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Workers' compensation laws cov-
ered nonrailroad cases, street railroad cases, and some railroad cases if the
person was not involved in interstate commerce. Typically, railroad work-
ers in the nontrain category were ones who were not likely to be involved
in interstate commerce and probably were covered by a workers' compen-
sation law.
Index of Accident Risk
The index of manufacturing accident risk is based on the workers' com-
pensation premiums that Ohio employers paid into the Ohio State Insur-
ance Fund in 1923, and the distribution of manufacturing employment in
1899, 1909, 1919, and 1929. The index is a weighted average of the acci-
dent risk in each state's manufacturing industries, where the relative dan-
ger in each industry is held fixed over time. The only reason a state's index
would change over time is because of changes in the relative employment
in each industry. Our measure of the accident risk in each industry is
workers' compensation premiums that employers in a wide range of indus-
tries paid per one hundred dollars of payroll into Ohio's state-run com-
pensation fund in 1923. The premiums were reported in Ohio Industrial
Commission (1923). The workers' compensation premiums are a reason-
able measure of the relative danger across industries because the Ohio
Industrial Commission experience rated the premiums such that indus-
tries paid higher premiums if they generated relatively more accident costs.
We chose Ohio premiums because the state had a broader set of industries
than most other states for which data were available. The employment
data for each industry in each state, which are used as the weights in the
weighted average calculation, represent the average number of wage earn-
ers in the industry. The data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1902,
vol. 7; 1913, vol. 9; 1923, vol. 8; 1933, vol. 3). The risk index for the inter-
vening years was calculated using a straight-line interpolation.
Manufacturing Firm Size and Value Added
The percentage of manufacturing establishments employing less than
five workers and more than five hundred workers were reported by the
census for the years 1899, 1909, 1914, 1919, 1929, and 1939. We used
straight-line interpolations to fill the intervening years. The data were col-
lected from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1902, vol. 7, 336-67; 1913, vol.
8,469; 1917,422-25; 1923,vol. 8,90; 1933,vol. 1,72-73; 1943,vol. 1,169).
Manufacturing value added per manufacturing worker was reported in
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1927, 1929, and 1931. The values were deflated using the CPI (1967 =
100, series E135 in U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 211). Values for the
intervening years were determined using straight-line interpolation. Hand
trades were excluded. Data from 1899, 1904, and 1909 are from U.S. Bu-
reau of the Census (1913, vol. 8, 542-44); 1914 data are from U.S. Bureau
of the Census (1917, 171-73); data for 1921, 1923, and 1925 are from U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1928, 1283-87); 1919, 1927, and 1929 are from U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1933, vol. 1, 17-20); and 1931 data are from U.S. Bu-
reau of the Census (1935, 21).
Employment Shares in Agriculture, Manufacturing, and Mining
The percentages of gainfully employed workers in agriculture, manufac-
turing, and mining were reported in the population censuses for the years
1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930. See U.S. Bureau of the Census (1902, vol. 2,
508; 1913, vol.4,44 45; 1923, vol.4,48; 1933, vol.5,54). Straight-line inter-
polation was used to fill the intervening years.
Unionization Index
The union index implicitly assumes that the national unionization rates
for each industry in 1899, 1909, 1919, and 1929 were the same across
states. For each of the four manufacturing census years, we calculated a
weighted average of the unionization rates across each state's manufactur-
ing industries. The weights are the shares of the manufacturing wage earn-
ers in each industry. We used Whaples's (1990, 434-47) estimates of the
unionization rates in each manufacturing industry from 1909. We then
followed Whaples's procedure to recalculate his 1919 unionization rates
across industries and to derive estimates for 1899 and 1929 using informa-
tion on union membership from Wolman (1936). The average number of
wage earners was reported by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (see the ear-
lier section on accident risk for sources).
To fill in the years between 1899, 1909, 1919, and 1929 for each state,
we interpolated based on movements in the ratio of U.S. trade union mem-
bership (Wolman 1936, 16) to nonagricultural employment (series D-127
in U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 137).
State Government Spending on Labor Programs
The costs to state government of labor programs include spending for
factory inspection, labor bureaus, mining inspection, bureaus of labor sta-
tistics, boards of arbitration, boiler inspector, and free employment bu-
reaus. The data were collected from appropriations to state labor depart-
ments reported in the states' statutes. For each state-year observation we264Appendix I
collected the appropriations for factory inspection, boards of conciliation
and arbitration, bureaus of labor, bureaus of labor or industrial statistics,
free employment bureaus, boiler inspection (but not ship boiler inspec-
tion), mining inspection, industrial welfare commissions, and industrial
commissions from the states' session laws. In many states appropriations
were given for all labor spending without separating out what share went
to each division. In a few states, Iowa for example, the statute volumes
offered the exact amounts spent by the state treasurer. Some states were
either missing appropriations volumes or the appropriations were unnec-
essarily obtuse. In those states we used interpolations to fill any gaps. In
interpolating we tried to be sensitive to the fact that many states were on
a two-year cycle and often gave the same amount of appropriations in
both years of the cycle. Maryland and Michigan offered extremely unin-
formative appropriations information. For Michigan we collected the
appropriations data from the Michigan Auditor General's Annual Report
for years between 1900 and 1920. For Maryland we collected information
from the Maryland Bureau of Statistics and Information, Annual Reports.
We deflated the expenditures using the CPI (1967 = 100) and then di-
vided the real expenditures by an estimate of the number of workers gain-
fully employed in the state. The employment estimate was determined by
calculating the share of total U.S. citizens gainfully employed in each state
for the years 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 from series D-26 in U.S. Bu-
reau of Census (1975, 129-31). The shares between the census years were
calculated using straight-line interpolations. We then multiplied the shares
for each state and year by total employment in the United States in each
year (series D-5 in U.S. Bureau of Census 1975, 126) to create an estimate
of employment in each state.
The Political Composition of State Legislatures
The variables indicating political power shifts in each state legislature
are based on the number of Republicans, Democrats, and other party
members in each chamber of the state's legislature at each legislative ses-
sion. For each state we sought information on the political structure of
the state legislature from legislative manuals, state bluebooks, House and
Senate journals, newspapers, and historical listings. In many of the south-
ern states the legislatures were overwhelmingly Democratic and many of
the bluebooks did not bother to list party affiliations.
To fill in any gaps we encountered, we used information from the New
York Secretary of State Manual for the years 1925 to 1940. The data there
seem reasonably accurate when matched up against information we col-
lected from states' bluebooks. For the earlier years we collected informa-
tion from the Chicago Daily News Almanac and Yearbook, 19 18-30, Trib-
une Almanac, 1900-1909, and World Almanac and Encyclopedia, 1910-18.Data Sources and Descriptions of Quantitative Variables265
There is still probably some measurement error in the data. This is due to
some disagreement among the sources as to the exact party splits of the
legislatures either because some legislators may have changed parties mid-
course or because people died and vacancies were filled.
We determined whether the legislature was in session by examining the
frequency of each state's legislative sessions, as reported in U.S. Bureau of
the Census (1918, 62-63). However, because some states held special ses-
sions during the period under investigation, we examined the statute vol-
umes for each state to determine all of the years that the legislatures met.
Presidential Voting Information
The percentage of votes for Republican and socialist presidential candi-
dates are from Congressional Quarterly (1975, 28 1-91). Socialist votes in-
clude votes for socialist candidates and in 1924 votes for LaFollette. The
values for years between presidential elections are based on straight-line
interpolations between election years. The progressive voting measure in
1912 is the percent voting for Roosevelt for president in 1912. For years
between 1908 and 1912 values were derived from a straight-line interpola-
tion between zero in 1908 and the value in 1912. After 1912 the values are
assumed to be the 1912 value on the grounds that the progressive ideas
espoused by Roosevelt in 1912 were subsumed under other parties.
Southern States
The dummy for southern states gives a value of one to Alabama, Arkan-
sas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
Labor Laws in the Various States
We created a series of dummy variables that took on a value of one if
the state had enacted various labor laws, and zero otherwise. The index
includes the following laws that were supported by organized labor: mini-
mum wage laws, union trademark laws, laws protecting labor organiza-
tions, mothers' pension laws, antiblacklisting laws, armed guard laws, laws
stating that labor agreements were not conspiracies, laws preventing the
false use of labor membership cards, laws limiting injunctions, laws ex-
empting labor organizations from antitrust laws, laws against employers
not telling incoming workers about the existence of a strike, laws allowing
the incorporation of labor unions, and laws prohibiting contracts that re-
strain workers from joining labor unions. The index also considers laws
that unions opposed: antiboycotting laws, laws preventing conspiracies
against workers, laws preventing the enticement of workers, laws pre-266Appendix I
venting interference for workers in all industries, laws preventing interfer-
ences for workers only in railroad industries, laws against the intimidation
of workers, and laws against picketing. We also created a dummy variable
indicating whether the state had a general women's-hours law, which took
on a value of one if there was a women's-hours law covering manufactur-
ing, mercantile, or other types of occupations. The information regarding
the status of these labor laws in each state was obtained from the Depart-
ment of Labor's series "Labor Laws of the United States and Decisions of
the Courts Related Thereto." The volumes include U.S. Commissioner of
Labor (1892, 1904, 1908) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletins
148 (1914), 370 (1925a), 552 (1931), and 590 (1933). The women's-hours
laws were collected from Smith (1929). Data for intervening years and the
years that the laws were adopted were obtained from the states' statutes.
To compute the overall labor law index we vector-added the dummy var-
iables that represent the prolabor laws described above and the women's-
hours law and subtracted those dummy variables that indicate laws that
were inimical to labor's interests. Finally, to this measure we added an
estimate of the share of men covered by men's-hours laws. For each state
we calculated the number of men working in industries and occupations
such as public employment, railroads, street railroads, and miningthat
were covered by an hours law and divided this number by the total male
employment in 1910. Although some states had a general law declaring
men's-hours restrictions, the vast majority of these laws were passed in the
1800s and were rarely enforced. In order to give some weight to the fact
that a state had a general men's-hours law, even though it was rarely en-
forced, we added 0.1 to our estimated percentage of men covered by an
hours law. We used 1910 gainful employment as the basis for our calcula-
tion because we wanted the labor law index to capture changes in the
laws and not changes in employment. The men's-hours law data are from
Brandeis (1966, 540-63). The number of males age ten and over gainfully
employed in each industry by state in 1910 was collected from U.S. Bureau
of the Census (1913, vol. 4, 96-151).
Progressive Law Index
To create the progressive law index, we created a series of dummy vari-
ables that took on a value of one if the state had enacted the law and zero
otherwise. The index is the sum of the dummies for the following laws:
compulsory attendance at school, establishing a state tax commission, es-
tablishing a state welfare agency, establishing a merit system, initiative and
referendum, direct primary, minimum age for child labor, mothers' pen-
sion, and a state commission to regulate electricity rates. The information
on commissions regulating electric rates is from Stigler and Friedland
(1962). The remaining variables were collected from Jack Walker's ICPSRState versus Private Insurance267
Data Set Number 0066, "Diffusion of Public Policy Innovation Among
the American States." The information on the mothers' pension laws was
obtained from the U.S. Commissioner of Labor (1892, 1904, and 1908).
Information for later years was obtained from U.S. Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics Bulletins 148 (1914), 370 (1925a), 552 (1931), and 590 (1933).
Appendix J
State versus Private Insurance: An Ordered-Probit
Analysis of the State's Choice
To examine the impact that interest groups and political reformers had on
the state's involvement in writing workers' compensation insurance, we
added further to the analysis reported in Fishback and Kantor (1996). We
estimated an ordered probit. The dependent variable is an ordinal ranking
depending on which form of insurance the state had in effect in 1930
either private insurance (coded 0), a state fund that was designed to com-
pete with private carriers (1), or a monopoly state fund (2). In the majority
of states, the ultimate state fund decision was made in the year workers'
compensation was first adopted. In a handful of states, however, workers'
compensation was first enacted without a state fund for political expedi-
ency, but was subsequently amended to include state insurance.44 For those
states our analysis considers the year in which the legislature adopted the
state fund (or lack thereof) because it represented their long-term choice.
The analysis is based on a sample of the forty-four states that had enacted
a workers' compensation law by l930. The data for each observation are
drawn from the year in which each of the forty-four states made its deci-
sion relating to the form of state insurance it had in place in 1930. For ex-
ample, Washington had a monopoly state fund in 1930 that was enacted
in 1911. Therefore, the independent variables reflect Washington's political
economic environment in 1911.
Since state insurance represented such a radical change in public policy,
we anticipate that it would have taken a major change in a state's political
environment to enact the legislation. To test this hypothesis, we include
two dummy variables that indicate whether the state insurance question
was decided by a legislature that had experienced a power shift since its
last meeting. The first legislative power shift variable takes a value of one
if in at least one branch of the state's legislature, the majority party of the
previous session lost its majority. The second dummy variable has a value
of one if both branches of the legislature experienced a party shift in the
year the state insurance decision was made. In our sample it is always the
case that if both legislative chambers switched parties, they changed to268Appendix J
the same party. We speculate that the probability of enacting a state fund
was much more likely if both branches of a state's legislature experienced
a power shift, otherwise each branch would have had veto power over the
decisions of the other.
We also include two other ways to test the impact of progressive reform-
ers. The first is the percentage of the electorate that voted for Theodore
Roosevelt in 1912 when he ran on the progressive platform. This method
is imperfect because it measures the support for the national progressive
platform in 1912, even though many states made the state insurance choice
in other years. We also included an index of progressive legislation that
had been passed in the state at any point in time. The index measures the
number of laws from the following list of progressive proposals that the
state had passed: ballot initiatives, referenda, direct primaries, a mothers'
pension law, a state tax commission, compulsory school attendance legis-
lation, a state welfare agency, a merit system for state employees, a mini-
mum age for child labor, and a state commission to regulate electricity
rates.
The impact of special interests is captured by several variables. Unions,
who ardently supported state funds, are represented by a manufacturing
union index, which combines the national percentage of each industry
that was unionized with the distribution of employment across industries
within each state. The strength of insurance interests, who strongly op-
posed state intervention in the insurance industry, is measured as the ratio
of life insurance premiums collected in the state to the state's employment.
The percentage of gainfully employed workers in agriculture captures the
relative strength of farming interests within each state. The percentage of
manufacturing workers employed in plants with more than five hundred
workers is used to capture the influence of large firms. We have also in-
cluded a dummy variable for southern states to see if there was a separate
southern region effect.
The results of an ordered probit estimation are reported in table J. 1. The
results suggest that both political coalitions and narrowly defined eco-
nomic interest groups played important, and statistically significant, roles
in the adoption of state funds. As predicted, and holding political shifts
constant, states that had a greater union presence were more likely to
adopt a state fund, while in states that had relatively strong insurance and
agricultural interests, employers were more likely to retain their freedom
to insure through private firms. As a measure of the impact that these
interest groups had on the probability of enacting state insurance, we cal-
culated the marginal effect that a one-standard-deviation (OSD) change
in each of the independent variables had on the baseline probability of
adopting a monopoly state insurance fund. The baseline probability is a
prediction of the probability that the state imposed a monopoly fund,
based on the sample means for the independent variables. An OSDSources: Information on state funds came from Clark (1911, 906-9) and the following Bulletins from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics series on Workmen's Compensation and Insurance: 126, 185, 203, 240,
243, 272, 275, 301, 332, 379, 423, 496. Where these sources left confusion, we examined the states'
statutes directly. For details on the sources of the independent variables, see appendix I.
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses below the means. Value of t-statistics are reported under
the coefficients. The estimated ordered-probit threshold coefficient is 1.63, with a t-ratio of 2.33.
aThe impact for each interest group variable and the Roosevelt progressive vote variable is the change
in the baseline probability associated with a one-standard-deviation change in each variable, holding
the other variables constant. The marginals of the power-shift variables are switches from 0 to 1, holding
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(9.35) (1.36) increase in the
percent voting
for Roosevelt
Index of progressive 5.93 0.313 1.55 increase in 0.025
laws (1.55) (1.38) progressive law
index
Power shift in at 0.34 0.891 Power shift in 0.053
least one branch
of legislature
(0.49) (1.20) only one
legislative
branch
Power shift in both 0.091 2.175 Power shift in 0.429
branches (0.29) (2.72) both legislative
branches
Southern state 0.273 1.26 Southern state 0.083
(0.45) (1.06)
N 44 44
Table J.1 Ordered-Probit Results of States' Choices between No State Fund, Competitive
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increase in the union index increased the chances of choosing state insur-
ance by 8.6 percentage points. A decrease in the life insurance variable,
on the other hand, increased the probability of choosing a monopoly state
fund by 48.5 percentage points. Farm interests had a strong influence over
the state insurance decision. An OSD fall in the percent of the gainfully
employed in agriculture increased the chances of enacting monopoly state
insurance by 68.9 percentage points. Finally, large firms also appear to
have reduced the probability of choosing a state fund in a statistically
significant fashion. An OSD decrease in the percentage of workers in
plants with over five hundred workers led to a 6.2 percent increase in the
probability of choosing the state fund.
Thus, with the right combination of strong unions and weaker than av-
erage agricultural and insurance interests, it was theoretically possible to
obtain the passage of state insurance even without a political power shift
in the legislature. This set of circumstances occurred in two statesNe-
vada and Wyoming. Nevada adopted a state fund in 1913 without a mea-
sured power shift. Nevada's predicted probability of adopting monopoly
state insurance in 1913 was 0.57, which was driven by a unionization rate
that was 1.6 standard deviations above the sample mean for all the states,
an insurance value 0.51 standard deviation below, and an agriculture value
0.76 standard deviation below the mean. Similarly, Wyoming adopted a
monopoly state fund in 1915 in part because the union variable was 1.36
standard deviations above the mean and the insurance variable was 0.79
standard deviation below.
Progressive reform movements also played an important role in the
choice of a state fund. In several states power shifts in both chambers of
the legislature played a significant role in the decision to adopt a monop-
oly state fund. If only one branch of the legislature experienced a power
shift, the effect was small and statistically insignificant. It appears that the
presence of an entrenched political party in one branch limited whatever
ambitions the new political coalition espoused in the other branch. On the
other hand, if both branches shifted, the probability of choosing a mo-
nopoly state fund changed in a dramatic and statistically significant man-
ner. By adding a power shift in both branches of the hypothetical base-
line state, the probability of enacting a monopoly state insurance fund
increases by 42.9 percentage points. Of the four states in our sample
that experienced a power shift in both branches of the legislature, Ohio
adopted a monopoly state fund, and Colorado, Idaho and Utah adopted
competitive state funds.
The other measures of progressive reform have a positive relationship
with the choice of a state fund, although the effects are not statistically
significant. An increase in the percentage of people voting for Roosevelt
gives an indication of the general interest in national progressive platform
as of 1912. In states where the percentage voting for Roosevelt was a stan-dard deviation higher than the mean, the probability of adopting a mo-
nopoly state fund rose by 3.4 percentage points, although the ordered-
probit coefficient was not statistically significant. A larger index of pro-
gressive legislation was also associated with a higher probability of adopt-
ing a state fund, although again the coefficient was not statistically sig-
nificant.46
Finally, there does not appear to have been a southern regional bias
against the adoption of state insurance funds. The coefficient of the south-
ern variable is not negative and we cannot reject the hypothesis of no
effect.
The ordered-probit analysis results, taken as a whole, indicate that the
adoption of monopoly state insurance was relatively unlikely. In Nevada
and Wyoming it came about because of an unusual combination of strong
unions and relatively weak insurance interests. If the proper combination
of narrow economic interest groups did not exist, then monopoly state
insurance was unlikely to be enacted unless union leaders melded their
demands with the broader socioeconomic agenda of a strong political re-
form movement, as discussed in chapter 6.
Appendix K
A Quantitative Analysis of Workers'
Compensation Benefit Levels
In chapter 7 we describe the results of a quantitative analysis of workers'
compensation benefit levels. This work was originally reported in Fish-
back and Kantor (1998b). Our quantitative analysis examines both the
initial benefit parameters that states established as well as changes in those
benefits through 1930. We have collected information on the extent of
union strength, the extent of accident risk, potential differences in the de-
gree of the wage offset across states, firm size, and a measure of manufac-
turing productivity. In addition, as in our other empirical analyses, we have
included variables that capture the influence of broad-based political co-
alitions and the impact of the workers' compensation bureaucracy after it
was in place.
It is worth commenting briefly on two parameters of the model for
which empirical information is not easily obtained: the extent of experi-
ence rating and the extent of wage offsets. We discuss the role of experi-
ence rating in influencing employers' and workers' choices of benefit levels
in chapter 7. We may be able to test what influence the less-complete expe-
rience rating of smaller firms had on the determinants of benefit levels.
Given that insurers actively sought to adjust premiums across industries,
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our crude measures of accident risks across industries are unlikely to cap-
ture fully the subsidies that sometimes arose from temporary mismatches
between the insurance rates that industries paid and their actual accident
experiences.
Another important consideration, but not easily measurable, is the ex-
tent to which workers paid for higher benefits through market adjustments
in their wages. Chapter 3 shows that wage offsets varied across industries
and by union status. Nonunion miners experienced wage reductions that
fully offset the insurance costs of providing workers' compensation bene-
fits; lumber workers experienced wage offsets that covered the value of
their expected benefits, but did not fully cover the employer's insurance
costs of providing the benefits; while unionized coal workers and building
tradesmen experienced much smaller wage offsets. We do not have enough
direct information on the extent of wage offsets in each state, although we
may be able to gain some insights by examining the relationships between
benefit levels and the union index, the percentage of workers in mining,
and the productivity variable.
The dependent variable is the natural log of each state's expected work-
ers' compensation benefit index (in 1967 dollars), which is shown in table
The regression equations are estimated in semilog form, controlling
for year and state fixed-effects. The year effects control for unmeasured
influences, such as World War I, that were common to all states during a
particular year. In addition, they play an important role in controlling
for changes over time in the weekly wage used to calculate the workers'
compensation benefits. The benefits for each state are calculated using the
national average weekly manufacturing wage, which rose substantially
over time. Failing to control for year effects might lead to a spurious posi-
tive relationship between the average manufacturing wage in a state, which
was typically correlated with changes in the national average manufactur-
ing wage, and our measure of the benefit levels in that state. The state
dummy variables control for unmeasured characteristics of a state that did
not change over time. These might include the rules governing the state
legislature, the underlying political strength of employers and workers,
and political attitudes that remained unchanged during the period under
consideration. To the extent that some of our independent variables did
not vary over time within a particular state or did not vary across states
during a particular year, then the state and year fixed-effects, respectively,
will diminish the importance of these variables in explaining the benefit
levels. Thus, after controlling for the state and year effects, the coefficients
of the remaining variables capture the relationship between the benefit
parameters and the components of the right-hand-side variables that were
not state or year specific. F-tests reject the hypothesis that the coefficients
of the year and state effects are jointly equal to zero.48
Our sample is an unbalanced panel because states are only included inNotes to Appendixes 273
the analysis after they had adopted workers' compensation. The determi-
nants of benefits, therefore, are estimated conditional upon the state's en-
actment of a workers' compensation law. To control for any selectivity bias
that might arise from the conditional nature of the analysis, we used the
following procedure. First, we estimated a reduced-form probit equation
where the dependent variable reflects the presence of a workers' compen-
sation law for the sample of forty-eight states in each year from 1910 to
1930. From this equation we calculated the inverse Mill's ratio, which was
then used as a sample-correction variable in the fixed-effects benefits re-
gression. We report the results in table K. 1 both with and without the
selectivity correction, but we focus the discussion on the results with the
selectivity correction because the t-test for the coefficient of the inverse
Mill's ratio suggests the presence of selectivity bias when estimating the
benefits equation (see the last column of the table).49
The results are consistent with the suggestion that legislators chose ben-
efit levels by weighing the demands of both employers and workers. Even
though workers were more politically numerous and thus a worker was
likely to be the median voter, it appears that legislatures also heeded the
demands of employers. Meanwhile, in the states where workers had more
political clout through unionization, they were successful in shifting the
benefit levels upward. Benefit levels were higher, ceteris paribus, in states
with greater unionization, where political upheaval led to shifts in party
control of the state legislature, and where bureaucracies, as opposed to the
courts, administered the workers' compensation system.
One sign that state legislatures responded to the demands of high-
accident-risk employers is that benefits were lower in states where more
workers were employed in dangerous industries. The comparative statics
predict that employers in more dangerous industries would prefer lower
benefit levels, while the impact of higher risk on the workers' demands for
benefit levels is theoretically unclear. The analysis includes two measures
of accident risk: one that proxies accident risk in manufacturing, which is
based on the industrial mix in each state, and the other that is the percent-
age of workers in mining, one of the most dangerous forms of employment
during this time period. The coefficients of both the manufacturing acci-
dent risk index and the percentage of workers in mining are negative and
statistically significant. A one-standard-deviation (OSD) increase in the
risk index (0.57) from its sample mean (1.48) would have reduced benefits
by about 19.1 percent. Similarly, an OSD increase (4.4) in the percentage
of workers in the dangerous mining industry was associated with a 10.6
percent reduction in benefit levels.
Another sign that legislators were attentive to the demands of employers
is the absence of a statistically significant effect of wages on benefit levels.
Theoretically, higher wages would have caused workers to seek higher ben-
efit levels. On the other hand, the employer's choice of benefit levels wasTable K.1 Coefficients from Regression Analyses of Expected Workers' Compensation
Benefits, 1910-30
R2 0.87 0.88
N 702 702 702
Sources: Fishback and Kantor (1998b, 124). See appendix I.
Notes: The dependent variable is natural log of expected benefits in constant 1967 dollars (see table
7.1). Use of deflators besides the CPI with a 1967 base does not change the results. Absolute value of
t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficients and standard deviations are below the means.
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Instrument for average manufacturing
wage in the state (1967 dollars)a
Manufacturing accident risk index
Percentage of labor force employed
in mining
Manufacturing value added per
worker (thousands; constant 1967
dollars)
Percentage of workers in
manufacturing establishments
with more than 500 workers
Percentage of workers in
manufacturing establishments
with less than 5 workers
Manufacturing unionization index
Political climate
Power shift in at least one branch
of legislature
Power shift in both branches of
legislature
Percentage of presidential vote for
Republican
Percentage of presidential vote for
socialist
Workers' compensation administered
by commission or state fund in
prior year
Lambda (inverse Mill's ratio)b
Year dummies (all except 1930)
State dummy variables (all except
Connecticut)Table K.1 (continued)
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aThe instruments for the wage are predicted values from a wage regression equation using the accident
risk, union, mining, productivity, firm size, power shift, and presidential vote variables listed above,
plus percent black, percent foreign born, percent illiterate, percent urban, strike activity, percent of
the gainfully employed in agriculture, and percent of the gainfully employed in mining. We have also
experimented with using a five-year lagged value of wages as an instrument. We chose a five-year lag
because the wage information was interpolated over five-year periods prior to 1919 and two-year peri-
ods after 1919. The coefficients and t-tests using the five-year lagged wage were similar to those reported
in the table above.
bThe selection equation based on whether states had adopted workers' compensation or not was run
on a sample of 1,002 observations with the following variables: presence of an employers' liability law
that substantively affected the common law, presence of an employers' liability law that simply restated
the common law, and all of the variables above, except the state and year dummies, the wage instrument,
and the dummy for the presence of the commission. We did not include the state and year dummies
because of multicollinearity problems when they are included.
unaffected by the wage in the theoretical model. This does not imply that
the employer was indifferent to changes in benefit levels that were caused
by wage changes. Instead, his optimal benefit choice was the same whether
the wage was high or low; therefore, the employer would have been op-
posed to changes in the benefit level that were driven only by wage
changes, holding other relevant determinants constant. To examine the im-
pact of wages on benefit levels, the regression includes an instrument for
the current year's wage in each state to avoid potential simultaneity prob-
lems.50 The wage coefficients in the table show that an OSD increase leads
to a 3.8 percent increase in benefits, but we cannot reject the hypothesis
that there was no relationship. Thus, in states where wages were higher,
employers appear to have been successful in limiting the benefit increases
that workers sought because their wages rose.
Our theoretical prediction is that employers with higher product prices
and/or labor productivity would likely seek higher benefits. The combined
impact of product prices and labor productivity in manufacturing is cap-
tured by the measure of manufacturing value added per worker. In the
table the coefficient of the value-added variable is positive, but very small
and statistically insignificant. The weakness of this relationship might be
the result of wage offsets that would dampen the impact that higher bene-
fits had on a worker's overall remuneration package and, thus, productiv-
ity. Employers at high productivity firms might have had more inelastic
demands for labor, which might have reduced the size of the wage offset
that workers experienced. If so, employers with higher value-added may
have balanced the productivity benefits from higher workers' compensa-
tion benefits against the fact that they were likely to pay a higher percent-
age of those benefits, thus weakening their support for higher benefits.
To test the impact of firm size on benefit levels, we also included mea-
sures of the percentage of manufacturing workers working in establish-
ments with one to five workers and in those with more than five hundred276Notes to Appendixes
workers.51 In the theoretical model, the sign of this effect is uncertain. The
size variables might also be influenced by incomplete experience rating
within industries, since larger firms paid premiums that were more fully
experience rated than smaller firms. Employers and workers in the smaller
firms therefore might have pressed for higher benefits. On the other hand,
workers' compensation laws allowed small firms to avoid joining the work-
ers' compensation system, which may have left them largely indifferent in
the benefits debate. The effects of both measures of firm size on benefit
levels are small and statistically insignificant.
The political strength of workers generally was greater in areas with
more unionization. We developed an index of unionization in manufactur-
ing that combines the national percentage of each industry that was un-
ionized with the distribution of employment across industries within each
state. In essence, the variable captures the extent to which industries that
were strongly unionized at the national level were represented in each
state. Greater unionization was not only associated with greater political
strength, but unionized workers also had relatively strong incentives to
push for higher benefit levels because they were more effective at pre-
venting wage offsets. On the other hand, the lower wage offset meant that
employers had an incentive to lobby for lower benefit levels. The regression
results indicate that in states dominated by industries where organized
labor had a greater national presence, organized labor was successful in
overcoming the pressure from employers for lower benefit levels. An OSD
increase in the unionization index (7.7) led to a statistically significant 5.2
percent increase in expected benefits.
Legislators may have had broader agendas than simply pleasing nar-
rowly focused economic interest groups. To ensure reelection they also had
to pay at least some attention to the demands of the electorate, which may
have meant balancing workers' compensation issues with other social, po-
litical, or economic issues. We have tried to measure the impact of broader
political agendas within each state in several ways. One way to measure the
political attitudes of voters is to include voting results from presidential
elections. The results suggest, however, that changes in voter support for
national Republican, Democratic, or more socialist views had little impact
on the benefit levels at the state level. After controlling for the state and
year effects, the effect of changes across states and time in the percentage
of the electorate voting for Republican candidates and socialist candidates
were small and statistically insignificant.52
Since workers' compensation legislation was state-based, we also have
tried to measure the influence of legislative upheavals at the state level.
Strong political reform movements during the Progressive Era often
caused the party composition of state legislatures to shift dramatically
around the time of the introduction of workers' compensation. Thus, dur-
ing these initial upheavals, we might expect to see higher benefits in set-Notes to Appendixes277
tings where political control of the legislature shifted from one party to
the other. Further, when the reformers' opponents attempted to retake the
legislature, they may have competed to obtain the support of the reform-
minded sectors of the electorate by proposing even higher benefits. For
example, in the 1914 gubernatorial race in Ohio, conservative Republicans
campaigned for higher benefits in their efforts to unseat a progressive
Democrat (Fishback and Kantor 1996).
We have included dummy variables that measure situations in which
the political dominance of one party shifted in at least one branch of the
legislature and in which it shifted in both legislative chambers. The debate
over accident benefits was certainly a controversial one, although perhaps
not as rancorous as the state insurance debate, and the empirical analysis
suggests that political party shifts also played an important role in helping
workers secure higher benefits. If one branch of a state legislature shifted
parties in a particular year, expected benefits rose by a statistically signif-
icant 5.1 percent. There was no additional effect on the benefit levels to
have both branches shift simultaneously. These results contrast with our
findings for the same variables in examining the overall adoption of work-
ers' compensation laws. It is also important to note that our measures of
shifts in political coalitions are incomplete and offer only a lower-bound
estimate of the importance of progressive political groups that sought sig-
nificant socioeconomic reforms in the early twentieth century.
Once workers' compensation was adopted, workers appear to have been
joined in the struggle for higher benefits by the bureaucratic agents that
administered the new system. States typically chose to administer their
workers' compensation programs in one of two ways. By 1930, ten states
administered the laws through the courts, with employers and workers es-
tablishing agreements regarding accident compensation subject to the stat-
utory guidelines and the courts settling disputes. Thirty-eight states ad-
ministered workers' compensation with a bureaucratic commission, which
directly oversaw the disbursement of accident compensation.53 The state
commissions had the potential to act as advocates for changes in the work-
ers' compensation laws because they were often a key source of informa-
tion for legislators, although their attitudes could have been influenced by
either employers or workers. We examine the bureaucrats' impact on bene-
fit levels by including a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the
state had a workers' compensation commission in operation at the end of
year t - 1, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable indicates the presence
of a commission in the previous year because the bureaucracy could lobby
the legislature in the current year only if it was already in existence. The
coefficient of the commission dummy implies that the presence of an ad-
ministrative body led legislatures to establish benefits that were 7.3 percent
higher, which is statistically significant.54 Thus, it appears that workers
benefited disproportionately from the administrative agencies' lobbying.278Notes to Appendixes
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The one caveat to this statement would be that if the worker's accident was
relatively minor, and he was only expected to lose a few days of work, then the
accident would probably go unreported. Because all states imposed waiting peri-
ods before accident benefits would commence, those accidents that were relatively
minor would still go unremunerated because the injured workers would be back
at work before the waiting period was over.
These data are from the Stonega Coke and Coal Company Records, Annual
Report of Operations Department (1925, 155).
For earlier information see Hoffman (1908, 461) and Fay (1916, 12-13). For
later information see Illinois Industrial Commission (1920) and Adams (1923, 41).
The nonfatal injuries for 1919 were arrayed as follows: 11 permanent total injuries,
1,275 specific losses, 297 disfigurements, 66 permanent partial disablements, 5,983
temporary total disablements, and 20 temporary partial disablements.
Iowa Employers' Liability Commission (1912, 106).
See Ohio Department of Inspection of Workshops, Factories, and Public
Buildings (1906-1913). The coverage of industries is the same in all of these com-
parisons.
The year of adoption may differ from the first year of operation because quite
a few states made their workers' compensation laws effective in the year after the
law was adopted.
A lump-sum settlement typically required a paternalistic hearing before a
state board to determine whether a lump-sum payment was in the best interest of
the family. Conyngton (1917, 119-21, 137-44) found that less than 13 percent of
the families of fatal accident victims in Ohio and Connecticut received their bene-
fits as lump-sum amounts.
The commission reported that they had some problems in 1909 locating the
families of workers injured in 1907. They originally sought 3,264 cases, but there
were 1,777 for whom information could not be obtained. The information was
based on the memories of the families in direct interviews. The distribution of
accidents investigated and reported across industries were similar.
Note that this replacement percentage is different from the one reported for
New York in tables 3.1 and B.4. Although the method of calculating the expected
workers' compensation benefits is the same here and in the table, the assumed
wage rates are different.
A second way in which the rise in benefits is understated stems from dis-
counting, but the effect is very small. We discounted the stream of benefits paid
out under workers' compensation using a 5 percent interest rate. We did not dis-
count any of the negligence liability benefits because we assumed they were lump-
sum payments. However, there typically were delays in the payment of the benefits
under negligence liability. Some of the delay was similar to what we see for workers'
compensation given the waiting period. On the other hand, at least one-third of
the death and permanent disability cases involved delays of at least a year in pay-
ments being made, and at least 20 percent of the death and disability cases involved
delays of over two years. This would lower the expected benefits by about four to
five cents, which is a very small percentage of annual income.
The sample size of survey respondents and nonrespondents appears to have
been about the same. Some companies did not fully state wages paid during dis-
ablement (but there is some question about this).
The 45.5 percent figure is similar to those reported in other states. Over theNotes to Appendixes279
period from 1902 to 1911, insurance companies doing employers' liability business
in Iowa paid out 51 .1 percent of the premiums they collected in the form of losses,
or direct payments to workers. See Iowa Employers' Liability Commission (1912,
103).
The New York Commission on Employers' Liability (1910, 254-55) also
reported information on what 327 employers employing 125,995 workers paid for
accidents under negligence liability. The total amount they paid was $254,636,
which is $0374 per $100 on the payroll. Of that amount, after eliminating legal
fees and conservatively estimating the insurance companies' expense ratio at 33
percent, the amount received by workers was approximately $202,580 or $0298
per $100 on the payroll.
We have used the following reasoning to deflate the $254,636 total to the
$202,580 amount eventually received by workers. Firms with liability insurance
only spent $45,925 and had total wages of $22,438,829. Given an expense ratio of
0.33, workers at these firms would have received about $30,770 in medical expenses
and wage payments, which is $0.1 37 per $100 on the payroll. For firms having both
liability insurance and other expenditures, their total wages were $22,896,808.
They spent $69,277.72 on liability insurance and $48,700 on other expenditures.
Of the liability insurance expenditures using an expense ratio of 0.33, $46,416
would have gone to compensating workers. Of the $48,700 in other expenditures,
$11,725 were contributions to benefit associations (which may not count as re-
quired, although it may have reduced the probability of lawsuits), $5,274 went to
payments of claims, $6,180 went to legal expenses, $9,194 went to medical ex-
penses, $12,363 went to wages, $2,157 went to pensions, $1,449 went to funeral
expenses, and $358 went to other expenses. Summing the claims, wages, pensions,
funeral expenses, payments to benefit associations, medical expenses, and other
payments yields a total of $42,520. So the maximum amount received by workers
from employers for wage replacement and medical expenses would have been
$88,936, which is $0.39 per $100 on the payroll.
Firms without liability insurance had total wages of $22,748,898. Of the $91,251
they spent on accidents, $1,640 was contributions to employee benefit associations,
$57,504 was paid in claims, $8,377 went to legal fees, $10,252 went to medical
expenses, $12,196 went to wage payments, $241 went to funeral expenses, and
$1,040 went to other expenses. Eliminating legal fees, the maximum amount going
to workers was $82,814.
The total amount that workers received for wage replacement and medical ex-
penses papers was $202,580. The total amount paid in wages was $680845 million,
which is about $0298 per $100 on the payroll.
The Michigan Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Commission
(1911, 10-11, 75-100) conducted a survey of 466 industrial employers, employing
99,134 workers, and asked them information on their costs of accidents. The
amount of money that they spent that went to workers was in the range of $0353
per $100 on the payroll. A collection of mining companies employing 21,080 work-
ers spent less than $0.34 per $100 on the payroll on compensating workers (see
Michigan Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Commission 1911,
10-11, 14, 84, 86-89, 98, 108I I). The employers paid $20,159 in wages during
the workers' disabilities, $43,225 in settlements, and $14,229 in other aid, first aid
expenses of $4,831, medical costs of $14,127, hospital costs of $9,574, and legal
costs of $2,707. The total, eliminating legal costs, is $106,145. They paid $120,111
for insurance. Assuming an expense ratio of 0.33, the workers would have received
$80,074 from employers.
Medical expenses are excluded because we have no good measure of medical280Notes to Appendixes
expenses under workers' compensation or under negligence liability To the extent
that the payments made to workers under negligence liability also covered the
workers' medical expenses, the payouts overstate the wage replacement that the
workers received.
Of the $52,225, we are certain that $48,075 was paid for accidents occurring
during the time frame. In several cases in the report of 1916, the date of the acci-
dent was not reported, but we could tell pretty well from context if it occurred in
1916, thus the additional $3,250 in payments are for accidents we are reasonably
certain occurred in 1916.
For 1916-18 we have the costs of coal production from the operating state-
ments of the company. We assumed that 74.1 percent of the operating costs went
to paying workers, based on evidence on the labor share of operating costs in 1921,
where we have information on both operating costs and wages paid.
For all years we have operating costs and for some years we also have direct
measures of labor costs. In the years when we have both, the labor costs are 74.1
percent of operating costs. Thus, we calculated labor costs in years where only
operating costs were available as 74.1 percent of operating costs. The 1916-18
percentages may be biased upward because they include coking accidents in the
numerator, while payments to coke workers are not reported in the denominator.
On the other hand, we cannot be certain that we have captured all of the informa-
tion on payments to workers, although the coverage seems fairly complete. The
1919-23 weeks of compensable accidents may overstate the amounts actually paid,
because it is the company's estimate of the severity of accident losses. Total weeks
of compensation for the period 1919-23 is from the Annual Report of the Operating
Department Stonega Coke and Coal Company Records (1925, 160). Information on
labor costs and operating costs comes from operating statements for the years
1912-19, 1920, 1921-29. Information on payouts to workers during the period
1916-18 come from the lawyer reports in the Annual Report of the Operating De-
partment, for the years 1916-21. The wage scales are in the Annual Report of the
Operating Department for 1929. All are in the records of the Stonega Coke and
Coal Company, at the Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware.
We have focused the analysis on thirteen occupational classes from the forty
specific occupations for which the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported wage
scales by 1923. The occupations chosen reflect a wide and representative character-
ization of the important building trades in the early twentieth century.
All the equations are estimated with weighted least squares because each
observation is a state (or city) average from samples of different sizes, which im-
plies that the variance of the error terms is inversely related to the number of
workers in each state. In the coal and lumber samples we used the square root of
the number of workers sampled for each observation as the weight. In the building
sample, the data sources did not provide information on the number of workers
sampled. Therefore, we used White's 1980 correction for heteroskedasticity We
have also estimated the lumber and coal equations using the White correction and
the main results are roughly the same as those reported below.
The prices for lumber and coal are the prices at the mill and the mine. Even
though both lumber and coal were competitive, national markets, prices at individ-
ual mines and mills varied substantially due to differences in the transport costs
of sending the product to market and variations in the quality and type of the
product.
The full-time hours per week in the lumber and building trades are not mea-
sures of labor supply. They reflect the constraints on working time offered by the
employer, such that workers might demand higher wages if full-time hours wereNotes to Appendixes 281
shortened. Similarly, in the coal industry the days variable is the number of days
the tipples operated, representing a measure of the maximum amount of working
time available to workers. Workers therefore made their labor-supply decisions
subject to the constraints on full-time hours.
All calculations are based on the mean earnings in the sample. When the
equations are run in semilog form, the wage reductions in response to workers'
compensation are similar, coal at 1.51 percent, lumber at 1.91 percent, and the
building trades at 0.35 percent.
We have also experimented with using the maximum allowable benefits as
an instrument for the expected benefits for all observations, and the results suggest
a negative and statistically significant wage offset in all cases. We did not focus on
these results because the wages in many occupations were not high enough to hit
the legal maximums.
We have also tried a specification for the coal sample that interacts the fatal
accident rate and expected benefits variable. The wage offsets are close to the ones
reported in the text. We cannot do the same interactions in the lumber and build-
ing trades samples because we have no information on differences in accident rates
across states and years.
We have experimented by including lagged benefits in the various equations. In
every sample when we included a lagged benefits term (up to three-year lag) along
with the contemporaneous benefits, the coefficient on the lagged term was consis-
tently small and not statistically different from zero.
To further investigate whether the dramatic changes in the American labor
market during the period under consideration has generated spuriously measured
wage offsets, we collected wage data for a relatively safe industry in an attempt to
determine whether these workers experienced a wage offset, even though they
stood to benefit very little from the change in expected postaccident benefits. If
we detected a strong wage offset, then this finding may imply that there is a spuri-
ous inverse relationship between benefits and wages during this time period. Cot-
ton textile work was much less risky than the others we have considered. Workers'
compensation insurance premiums for cotton mills, for example, were approxi-
mately one-tenth of the premiums of coal and one-fifth the premiums for lumber
and the building trades (these comparisons are based on the average workers' com-
pensation premiums that employers in each industry would have paid in Ohio,
New Jersey, Illinois, and Wisconsin in 1912, as reported in Washington Industrial
Insurance Department 1912, 277). We estimated regressions for a cotton textile
sample covering eight states with twenty-nine occupations for the years 1910-14,
1916, 1918, 1920, and 1922. The results revealed a large positive coefficient on the
benefits variable, which suggests that we should have few worries that the time
period analyzed here has imparted a spurious negative bias to the relationship
between wages and benefits. We are reluctant to draw definitive conclusions from
the cotton sample because the small number of states considered sharply limits
the effectiveness of our empirical tests.
We have investigated the variation further by running separate regressions
for each occupation in each industry As Gruber and Krueger (1991, 128-29) also
found, the wage-offset coefficients for individual occupations vary widely around
the estimates from the pooled sample of all occupations. The wage offsets for each
occupation in the coal and lumber industries are typically 1 (or more in absolute
value), although some are not precisely estimated. In the building trades, there was
a mixture of positive and negative coefficients, but we could detect no consistent
pattern of differences in the offsets for skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled workers.
As another test, we reestimated the full sample with interaction terms between the282Notes to Appendixes
state dummy variables and the occupation dummy variables. Inclusion of these
interaction terms does not change our main conclusions.
We have tried several methods of calculating benefits under negligence liabil-
ity, including inserting a value of zero for benefits under negligence liability and
assuming benefits based on death benefits of 50 percent of annual earnings, with-
out an adjustment for liability differentials. The results show the same pattern as
reported in the text.
Finding that workers' access to insurance was rationed prior to workers'
compensation does not necessarily imply that the new regime was a more efficient
legal system than negligence liability, as far as workplace accidents are concerned.
A worker consuming his desired level of insurance might not hold a socially opti-
mal amount. Viscusi (1991, 82) notes that as workers reach their optimal levels of
insurance, there may be increases in moral hazard, which raise the accident costs
of insurers and employers. In fact, studies of accident rates and modern problems
with fraudulent claims suggest that moral hazard problems have increased with
the passage of workers' compensation (Fishback 1987; Moore and Viscusi 1990).
A comparison of the relative efficiency of the two systems would require, at a
minimum, a complete examination of the employers' and workers' costs of acci-
dent prevention, the damages incurred by injured workers, the administrative costs
of the two systems, and other transaction and information costs.
We thank Martha Olney for making Claudia Goldin's occupation codes for
these data available to us. Goldin matched the listed occupation in the cost-of-
living survey with the occupation codes developed for the 1940 Census Public Use
Sample. In restricting the sample we eliminated professional and semiprofessional
workers (codes under 98), farmers and farm managers (98-99), proprietors, man-
agers, and officials (100-1 56), clerical and kindred workers (200-266), salespeople
(270-98), domestic service workers (500-520), protective service workers (600-
614), service workers (700-798), farm laborers and foremen (844-88), and non-
classifiable occupations (998-99).
Originally, most maritime states with workers' compensation laws claimed
jurisdiction over maritime industries, but the U.S. Supreme Court in Southern Pa-
cjfic Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), claimed that U.S. admiralty and maritime
law made state compensation laws inapplicable to maritime injuries. On 6 October
1917, Congress enacted the Johnson amendment which allowed state workers'
compensation laws to include maritime industries, but the law was declared uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court in Knickerbocker Ice Co.v. Stewart, 40 5. Ct.
438, 485 (1920). See French (1920).
For example, Arizona, Delaware, and Texas did not include public employ-
ment under workers' compensation; New Hampshire and New Mexico did not
mention public employees in the compensation act; Iowa exempted firemen and
policemen; Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Rhode Island allowed
individual municipalities to choose whether their public employees would be cov-
ered by the compensation law; Minnesota public employees were covered, except
for employees of the state and employees of cities whose charters provided their
own compensation schemes; Ohio exempted policemen and firemen in places
where pensions were established; and, finally, Oklahoma and Washington limited
coverage to public employees who were engaged in hazardous work. For further
discussion of these intricate rules, see Clark and Frincke (1921, 21-68).
We experimented with estimating separate probits for old-line life insurance,
industrial life insurance, and fraternal insurance. The coefficient of expected bene-
fits in each equation was small and statistically insignificant, just as we see when
we aggregated all life insurance policies in table F. I.Notes to Appendixes 283
We have also experimented with other specifications in the saving regression
by adding an interaction term between the accident-rate measure and the
expected-benefits variable. The magnitudes and t-tests of the expected benefits and
accident risk coefficients are similar to the ones reported in table F. I.
This technique was used in Pavalko's (1989) and Buffum's (1992) earlier stud-
ies of the adoption of workers' compensation and is widely used in tests of search
models. We focus on the period from 1909 to 1930 because of the substantial
changes in the attitudes of employers and labor unions during the course of the
period 1900 to 1908. As noted in the text, organized labor's attitude toward work-
ers' compensation reversed in 1909, thus the measure for organized labor would
have a different impact before and after 1909. When we estimate the hazard equa-
tion including information from the 1900 to 1930 period, we obtain largely the
same set of results, but not surprisingly, the effects are muted relative to those
reported in table H. I.
We also ran a cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression with years
since 1910 to adoption on the left-hand side of the regression and all but the legis-
lative change variables on the right-hand side. We got very similar results to the
ones we report in table HI. The variables that significantly reduce the time to
adoption are the presence of an employers' liability law limiting the common law
defenses, the ratio of employers' liability premiums to life insurance premiums,
manufacturing value added per worker, the percentage of workers in manufactur-
ing, the union index, and the presidential votes for Roosevelt in 1912. In this analy-
sis the effect of the state supreme court cases is no longer statistically significant.
We believe that the reason for this difference is that this variable in the various
states changed substantially over time, a feature missed by a cross-sectional an-
alysis.
Recall that total employers' liability premiums may have increased either
because rates increased or because more employers chose to insure their accident
liability risks. Since the empirical analysis controls for changes in manufacturing
accident risk and for the change in employers' liability laws, the measured impact
of the insurance ratio might suggest that employers saw workers' compensation as
a means to control their insurance costs.
The general impression of the development of progressivism at the national
level is that it rose to a peak in the 1912 presidential election. After 1912 many of
the progressive ideas were incorporated in both the Republican and Democratic
party platforms. To capture this rise and leveling off in each state, we constructed
the Roosevelt voting variable to start at zero in each state in 1908 and then to rise
through straight-line interpolation to the value in 1912. From 1912 onward the
variable retains its 1912 level. We have also run the analysis using the 1912 values
throughout with very little change in the results reported. We also reran the analy-
sis allowing the progressive variable to fall back to zero by 1916. In those cases
the progressive variable has very little impact.
Buffum (1992, 48) found that a power shift in either legislature enhanced the
probability of adopting a workers' compensation law.
There was one exception to this observation. In 1919 the Non-Partisan
League gained control of the upper house of the North Dakota legislature, while
the lower house had been captured by the Non-Partisans in 1917.
We chose a general power shift measure, as opposed to a party shift measure,
because there was substantial variation across states in the attitudes of Republi-
cans and Democrats. In many settings both the Republican and Democratic par-
ties established support for a workers' compensation measure in their state plat-
forms. Out of seventeen power shifts identified in our sample, ten were shifts from284Notes to Appendixes
Republican to Democrat, five were shifts in the other direction, one was a shift
from Republican to an even split, and there was one shift from Republican to
Non-Partisan League in North Dakota.
We were sensitive to the issue of unmeasured heterogeneity across states in
the sample, so we experimented with dummy variables representing much smaller
geographical groupings. Estimation of the model with dummy variables for eight
of the nine census regions led to results similar to those reported in table H. I. We
also estimated the model using dummy variables for groupings of two and three
states, and the results were qualitatively similar to those reported here. We are
unable to estimate the model with a dummy variable for all but one of the states
due to problems of perfect collinearity with the remaining variables in the analysis.
Nearby states include states in the same census region (of nine regions) and
other contiguous states. We have experimented with other measures of contagion,
such as the total number of states in the United States that have adopted and a
time counter. The basic results remain the same.
When we experimented with other variables that may capture the contagion
effect, such as a time trend or the number of other states within the entire United
States that had adopted the legislation, the results were nearly identical. When a
time trend and the neighborhood adoption variable were included together, the
impact of the neighborhood adoption variable remained strong and statistically
significant, while the coefficient of the time trend was small and statistically insig-
nificant. The results of the remaining variables were very similar to those reported
in column (2) of table H. I.
New York adopted workers' compensation without a state fund in 1910 and
later added a competitive state fund in 1913. Similar processes occurred in Califor-
nia (no fund 1911, competitive fund 1913), Arizona (no fund 1912, competitive
fund 1925), and Nevada (no fund 1911, monopoly fund 1913). In no case did a
state create a state fund and then revert to competitive insurance. In Kentucky the
workers' compensation law of 1914 was declared unconstitutional, and another
law was passed in 1916. We chose 1914 for the sample, although estimates with
1916 are very similar. The Missouri legislature passed several laws that were struck
down in referenda between 1919 and 1925, some with state insurance and some
without. We chose the 1925 law because that was the law that made it through the
referendum. We have also estimated an ordered probit equation where we added
observations representing each of the earlier decisions described above, and the
results changed very little. In addition, we have re-estimated the equation with
corrections for possible selection bias related to the year of the decision and found
essentially the same results.
By stopping in 1930, Florida (which adopted in 1935), South Carolina
(1935), Arkansas (1939), and Mississippi (1948) are left out of the sample. None
of these states adopted a state fund. Since these states were notably nonunion,
agricultural, probably low in insurance coverage, and had almost no change in the
party power in the legislature, we expect the results reported in table J.l to be
largely unchanged if these states were included in the sample.
We have also experimented with including a measure of spending on state
labor issues. It turns out that this variable is strongly related to the progressive
measures in part because it was a policy decision that progressives and labor lead-
ers pressed, like the state insurance fund. When we include the state labor spend-
ing, the coefficients for the progressive, state spending, power shift, and labor index
measures are all positive, as expected, but the coefficients are not statistically sig-
nificant individually; however, we can reject the hypothesis that they are all zero.
We have also estimated the equations using the expected benefits as a per-Notes to Appendixes285
centage of the annual wage as the dependent variable, and the results are very
similar to the ones reported here.
Comparisons of the coefficients from estimations with and without the state
and year effects show that the basic results are unchanged for the accident risk,
mining percentage, unionization, power shift, and state commission variables.
When the state and year effects are excluded, the coefficients of the value-added,
plant size, and Republican presidential voting variables are negative and statisti-
cally significant, and the presidential vote for the socialists has a positive and sta-
tistically significant effect on benefits. Given the construction of the benefits vari-
able, it is not surprising that the exclusion of the state and year effects leads to a
strong positive relationship between the benefit level and the wage variable.
Although the identification of the benefits equation in the two-stage process
is satisfied because of the nonlinearity of the probit, we have included dummy
variables for employers' liability laws in the selection equation and not in the bene-
fits equation. The presence of an employers' liability law was likely to influence
the initial adoption of the law, but not necessarily the level of benefits.
We wanted to eliminate the negative bias that arises when wages adjust
downward in the labor market to offset higher benefits. Inclusion of the contempo-
rary wage does lead to a smaller coefficient on the wage than those reported in
table K. I. We have experimented with several other instruments for the wage and
the results are essentially the same as those reported in the table.
It should be noted that this is not a measure of firm size because the manu-
facturing census reported the number of workers in an establishment. That is, if
workers for a firm were divided into two plants of four hundred workers each,
then these workers would not be included in the over-five-hundred measure.
Part of the impact of political sentiment, as measured by votes for presiden-
tial candidates, might be captured by the state effects if voter attitudes did not
change over time. When we estimate the equations without the fixed effects, the
Republican voting measure is negative and statistically significant and the socialist
measure is positive and statistically significant. The socialist measure includes
votes for candidates to the left of the Democrats, including LaFollette progressives
in 1924. In the analyses reported in table K. I, we have treated votes for Theodore
Roosevelt as Republican votes in 1912. We treat the two types of progressives
differently because Roosevelt progressives tended to be far more conservative than
the later LaFollette progressives. In our analysis of the overall adoption of work-
ers' compensation and the choice of state insurance (see appendixes H and J), we
have experimented with using the vote for Roosevelt in 1912 as a separate measure
of underlying progressive attitudes. In this model the measure would be collinear
with the vector of state dummies, so we cannot use it separately. We have also
rerun the equations including the state and year effects and separating the Republi-
can votes and the Roosevelt progressive votes. The progressive votes are interpo-
lated upward from zero in 1908 and back down to zero by 1916, following the
fortunes of progressive candidates at the national level. The socialist and Republi-
can votes have small and statistically significant effects, while the progressive vote
has a negative effect.
Wyoming administered the law through the courts but had a monopoly state
insurance fund, so we have treated it as having an administrative body in the re-
gression analyses.
There is potentially a simultaneity bias in this variable to the extent that
legislatures that created commissions when they first enacted a workers' compen-
sation law might have also favored higher benefit levels if legislatures chose a pack-
age favorable to organized labor. On the other hand, legislatures may have chosen286Notes to Appendixes
a compromise piece of legislation in which workers traded a commission for higher
benefits, or vice versa. We tried developing an instrument for this variable but we
could find no variables that belonged in an instrument equation for the commis-
sion that would not also be in the selectivity equation. Thus, the coefficient of the
commission variable might be overstated if the commission and high wages were
packaged together to appease unions, or understated if the commission was a com-
promise that unions accepted in return for lower benefits.